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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation investigates the market of individual philanthropy through two essays 
on religiosity and charitable giving by married couples. The second chapter examines whether 
people who engage in religious activities are more generous in terms of both religious and 
secular giving and whether gender differences exist in charitable giving within different levels of 
religiosity. The results of bivariate probit and tobit analyses show that religious people have a 
greater propensity to give and higher levels of giving to both religious and secular charitable 
organizations. A zero-inflated ordered probit model is used to analyze an individual donor’s 
decision-making process, and the results reveal that gender-based distinctions differ between 
religious and less-religious individuals in both magnitude and sign, although no gender 
difference is found for the whole sample. Since little research exists on the bargaining power of 
married couples over giving to charities, using newly available panel data on U.S. households 
from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study, the third chapter investigates the question of who 
has relatively greater bargaining power when the husband and the wife make charitable giving 
decisions together. Results suggest that the husband, on average, has significantly greater 
bargaining power than the wife, and bargaining over charitable giving reduces household giving 
by 8 percent. Moreover, the joint decision made by a family with traditional views on gender 
roles tends to have the husband with even more bargaining power.  
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"To give away money is an easy matter and in any man's power. But to decide to whom to give it, 
and how large, and when, and for what purpose and how, is neither in every man's power nor an 
easy matter." 
-Aristotle 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Philanthropy is a promising and quickly growing market. Total giving to charitable 
organizations in United States was $358.38 billion in 2014 (about 2.1% of GDP). This is an 
increase of 7.1% from 2013, and 85% from that in the late 1990s.
1
 Total charitable giving in 
United States has been on a steady rise since 1974, with only a temporary drop during the 
recession period. The trend in charitable giving over the last 40 years is shown in Figure 1. With 
a continuous rise for five years in a row, donations to charity reached record highs in 2014, 
passing the previous record set in 2007 before the recession began. Moreover, it is estimated that 
total charitable contributions will total between $21.2 to $55.4 trillion in between 1998-2052.
 2
 
                                                          
1
 Giving USA 2015: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2014.  
2
 The 2010 Bank of America Study of High Net Worth Philanthropy conducted by the Center on Philanthropy at 
Indiana University. 
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Figure 1. Trend in total charitable giving 
 
Source: Giving USA Foundation, Giving USA 2015 (in billions of dollars). 
 
The big number of charitable giving mainly comes from four sources which include 
individuals, charitable foundations, corporations, and bequests. Among these four sources, 
charitable giving by individuals has been historically the major source of the total charitable 
giving. As in previous years, the majority of charitable giving in 2014 came from individuals. 
Specifically, individuals gave roughly $258.51 billion (representing a 7.4% increase over 2013).
3
 
Figure 2 shows that in 2014 the charitable giving came from individuals at $258.51 billion, or 72% 
of total giving; followed by foundations ($53.97 billion/15%), bequests ($28.13 billion/8%), and 
corporations ($17.77 billion/5%). Nevertheless, individual giving keeps a steady rise. It has been 
clear gains in the total amount given by individuals in the last couple of years. In fact, the rise in 
contributions by individuals between 2011 and 2013 represents 73 percent of the growth in total 
giving during that period.
4
 
                                                          
3
 The Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics. 
4
 Source: seminal annual report on charitable giving in America, The 59th consecutive edition of Giving USA. 
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Figure 2. Percentage of Sources of Private Philanthropy, 2014 
 
Source: An overview of giving in 2014, Giving USA 2015 Highlights. 
 
Although individual philanthropy funding has a steadily rising trend, the access of 
nonprofit organizations to financial resources is becoming increasingly competitive, leading to 
greater competition among charities for private donations and thereby urging policymakers to 
formulate effective fundraising plans. Therefore, a deep understanding of the growing individual 
charitable giving market is indispensable for policy makers of fundraising organizations. 
Correspondingly, considerable scholarly attention has been paid to studying the donation 
behavior of individuals and households. This dissertation therefore concentrates on investigating 
the individual philanthropy. 
Decades of research on the individual philanthropy indicates that higher levels of 
charitable giving are positively associated with higher income, higher wealth, greater religious 
participation, volunteerism, age, marriage, higher educational attainment, US citizenship, higher 
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proportion of earned wealth versus inherited wealth, and a greater level of financial security 
(O’Herlihy, Havens, and Schervish 2002). For instance, as people get older they are typically 
more likely to give to charity and to give a greater fraction of their incomes. Likewise, those with 
more education give more often, give more dollars, and generally give a higher fraction of 
income. However, how gender, ethnicity, or religion, among other demographic characteristics 
impact participation in giving and amounts donated is more complex (O’Herlihy et al., 2002). 
Over 80% of the U.S. population expressed affiliation with a faith denomination. 88% 
American adults say that “my religious faith is very important in my life” (Showers et al. 2011). 
Therefore, religiosity, as a measure of the importance of religion to people, has been used in 
numerous researches. In a narrow sense, religiosity indicates how religious an individual is, 
regardless how an individual is religious. Published statistics show that religion plays a major 
role in how much money Americans give to charity. In particular, among Americans who claim a 
religious affiliation, 65 percent give to charity; among those who do not identify to be religious, 
56 percent make charitable gifts.
5
 From these general statistics, the parts of the country that tend 
to be more religious are also more generous.
6
 However, this is not the case based on the 
numerous existing studies. Due to the importance of religion to people’s behaviors, the link 
between religiosity and pro-social behavior, such as charitable giving, altruism, cooperation, 
helping, and volunteering, are widely studied in the literature. However, evidence in the 
literature on the causal relationship between the degree of religiosity and charitable giving 
(particularly secular giving) is still mixed for several reasons.  
The first reason could be the aggregated level of giving. Many previous studies 
investigate the causal relationship between religiosity and total giving. However, since there are 
                                                          
5
 Source: Religious Americans Give More, New Study Finds, The Chronicle of Philanthropy (NOVEMBER 25, 
2013). 
6
 Source: How American Gives, The Chronicle of Philanthropy. 
   
5 
 
different forces at work in shaping both religious and secular giving, empirical studies of 
charitable giving should work with disaggregated measures of giving (instead of total giving) 
whenever possible (Brown and Ferris, 2007; and Helms and Thornton, 2012). The second reason 
could be misspecification. Many previous studies of charitable giving and religiosity focus on 
giving at disaggregated levels, but they estimate religious giving and secular giving separately. 
This could cause inefficient and biased estimates because unobserved characteristics, such as 
donors’ tastes and attitudes towards money, are not accounted for in estimating the separate 
models. For an individual, religious giving and secular giving can be statistically correlated 
because the individual is likely to receive similar “warm glows” from both types of giving. A 
more appropriate to model charitable giving to different types of organizations will be a 
simultaneous system. Although some previous studies use methodologies of simultaneous 
system, the interpretations of the results are problematic. For bivariate or multivariate models, it 
is more appropriate to interpret the marginal effects rather than the yielded coefficients. For these 
mentioned reasons, the causal relationship between religiosity and giving is far from clear and 
worth more investigations.  
In the first essay, the goal is to address two research questions. First, whether religious 
people are more generous in terms of both religious and secular giving compared with less-
religious people, from both theoretical and empirical aspects. Second, whether gender 
differences exist in charitable giving for donor groups with different levels of religiosity, which 
is an extension of the first question. 
Using the 2001 survey data, chapter 2 uses the system of bivariate probit and bivariate 
tobit models to control for the potential correlation that might be caused by unobservable 
individual characteristics between religious giving and secular giving simultaneously, together 
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with appropriate interpretations. Additionally, evidence on the causal relationship between 
religiosity and charitable giving is limited from a theoretical prospective. According to the 
literature, religion motivates religious people to give more because it creates a social context in 
which people are more likely to give; religion also shapes people’s opinions about what is right 
and wrong and increases concern about other people’s wellbeing. Previous studies hypothesize 
that more religious people are more generous, without constructing the theoretical models.  But 
why are religious people more generous than non-religious people, theoretically? In order to 
bridge the gap in the previous studies, chapter 2 also offers a theoretical framework to explain 
the empirical findings. 
Both the theoretical and empirical findings on the first research question show that 
religious people have a greater propensity to give as well as higher levels of giving to both 
religious and secular organizations. The bivariate systems permit a test of the correlation across 
the different giving decisions, and the correlation between religious and secular giving is highly 
significant. After controlling for this correlation, the impacts of religiosity on religious and 
secular giving are smaller than expected.  
Since results from the first research question in chapter 2 show that people’s generosity 
increases with their religiosities, we may wonder whether men and women who have high 
religiosity would be equally generous in charitable giving. If the gender difference in charitable 
giving does exist, then to what extent does gender difference affect giving among religious 
people?  Is the difference likely to be negligible since religious men and women are both 
generous donors? Are they both generous among different levels of giving (e.g., low, medium, 
and high)? If there is no difference in giving according to gender, then is it necessarily true that 
there is no gender difference between secular men and women? Therefore, chapter 2 investigates 
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how gender differences affect charitable giving according to different levels of religiosity. 
Particularly, Chapter 2 demonstrates that previous empirical analyses on gender difference in 
giving masked important differences among donor groups with different religiosities. Empirical 
findings show that there are essentially no differences in the propensity of men and women to 
give to charity, however, this conclusion changes when taking religiosity into account. Gender 
difference exists between highly religious men and women only for low-level giving. In contrast, 
gender differences exist between less-religious men and women for all levels of giving (e.g., low, 
medium, and high). 
Perhaps the most important contribution of the study conducted in Chapter 2 to the body 
of literature on charitable giving is using a zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP hereafter) model, 
first proposed by Harris and Zhao (2007), to disentangle the effects of gender on the decision of 
whether and how much to donate. In fact, the impact of gender on the two decisions of whether 
to donate and how much to donate can differ in magnitude and in presentation. The failure to 
disentangle the varying effects of gender on generosity can cause bias in the estimation. 
Therefore chapter 2 attempts to reduce such bias by using a ZIOP model to distinguish the 
decision to donate and the decision of how much to donate. The investigation using ZIOP 
approach is the first know attempt to deconstruct people’s decision-making processes when the 
dependent variable “level of charitable giving” is ordered discretely. No analysis on charitable 
giving has thus far used the ZIOP approach. 
For the research of people’s charitable giving behaviors, survey data and experimental 
data are widely used. In conducting interviews for survey data, one representative is typically 
interviewed to answer a survey for the whole household. Most research on charitable giving thus 
assumes that decisions on charitable giving are a household decision rather than an individual 
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decision. This is a very restrictive assumption. In fact, household decisions are normally made 
through bargaining, and the bargaining process depends on the balance of power between the 
husband and the wife. Consequently, spouses bargain over most household outcomes, including 
charitable giving.  
However, little attention has been paid to this problem, and therefore little research exists 
on the bargaining power in married couples concerning charitable giving. Despite all this, the 
existing evidence on the intra-household bargaining over charitable giving is limited (Andreoni 
et al., 2003; Yoruk, 2009). In the second essay “Charitable Giving by Married Couples: Who Is 
Prevailing in the Bargaining”, the goal is to present new evidence on the effects of bargaining 
over giving to charities.  Using the longitudinal surveys of U.S. households in 2003 and 2005 by 
the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study, chapter 3 not only aims to investigate the question of 
who has greater bargaining power when husband and wife make charitable giving decisions 
together, but also aims to provide new insights into the question of who is prevailing in the 
bargaining over charitable giving by investigating the theory of traditional views on gender roles. 
Existing studies use either pooled cross-sectional or cross-sectional data, under the very 
restrictive assumption that there are no unobserved individual effects. However, failure to 
adequately control for certain unobserved characteristics may cause biased estimators. Chapter 3 
attempts to reduce such bias and inconsistency by using a longitudinal dataset, and thus offers 
new evidence of spousal bargaining over charitable donations within a household. In particular, 
the quality of the survey data used in this study is superior to other frequently-used household 
surveys of giving in the literature (Wilhelm, 2006). In addition, chapter 3 provides new insights 
into the question of “who is prevailing in the intra-household bargaining over charitable giving” 
by investigating traditional views on gender roles.  
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Results in chapter 3 show that the husband has significantly greater bargaining power 
than the wife when they jointly make decisions to give to charities. Instead of being beneficial to 
the amount of household giving to charities, the household bargaining is costly. The costly 
household bargaining generally reduces the household donation by 8%. Results in chapter 3 also 
support the theory of traditional views on gender roles. For strict Protestant couples, the wives 
indeed have a much lower authority to decide on the household’s charitable giving. However for 
couples who have less or non-protestant denominations, the husbands present a much lower 
authority but still dominate the decision-making on charitable giving. The bargaining in 
households with less traditional views on gender roles creates more “negative externalities” 
which yields a decrease in the amounts donated. 
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CHAPTER 2 
IS HOWARD MORE GENEROUS THAN HEIDI? RELIGIOSITY AND 
GENDER DIFFERENCE IN CHARITABLE GIVING
7
 
 
2.1 Religiosity, Gender, and Charitable Giving 
For purely and impurely altruistic reasons, many individuals donate to charities.
8
 
Charitable giving by a given individual is often relatively small, but total individual giving 
represents the largest share of philanthropic funding. For instance, although charitable giving by 
individuals, foundations, and corporations topped as high as $316 billion in the United States in 
2012, individual donations accounted for almost 72% ($229 billion) of the total.
9
 Moreover, such 
donations have risen at a rapid rate over the past two decades: the 2012 figure represented an 
increase of 85% from the amount given in the late 1990s.
10
 
Correspondingly, considerable scholarly attention has been paid to individuals’ and 
households’ donation behavior in order to better understand the promising phenomenon of 
individual philanthropy. Research has consistently shown that an individual’s income, education,  
                                                          
7
I am grateful to Thomas A. Garrett, Natalia Kolesnikova, Walt Mayer, John Conlon, Randall Walsh, Subhayu 
Bandyopadhyay, Tatevik Sekhposyan, and Nicolas L. Ziebarth for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions. 
I thank participants at the Southern Economic Association 2013 Annual Conference and the Midwest Economic 
Association 2014 Annual Conference for valuable comments. I also thank the Center on Wealth and Philanthropy at 
Boston College for providing the data. All errors are my own. 
8
 For impure altruism, please refer to “warm glow,” as studied by Andreoni, (1990). 
9
 This study defines charitable giving as the donation of money to an organization to benefit others beyond the donor 
per se. 
10
 Source: Giving USA 2013 Report Highlights. 
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and employment status are positively associated with his or her charitable giving behavior. 
However, there is mixed evidence regarding a causal relationship between the degree of 
religiosity (defined as the extent of involvement or participation in religious groups and activities) 
and charitable giving, particularly that of a secular nature.
11,12 
For example, Jackson et al. (1995), 
Brooks (2004), Forbes and Zampelli (2013), and Yoruk (2013) show that higher religiosity is 
associated with a greater probability of charitable giving to charity and/or higher donations. 
However, Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), Gruber (2004), Brooks (2005), and Brown and Ferris 
(2007) conclude that religiosity negatively affects charitable giving (whether considering 
religious, secular, or overall giving), while Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2004) find no 
relationship between religiosity and secular giving. 
There are three possible methodological drivers of these mixed results. First, many 
previous studies investigate the causal relationship between religiosity and total giving. However, 
as suggested by Brown and Ferris (2007), empirical studies of charitable giving should examine 
domain-disaggregated measures of giving (instead of total giving) whenever possible since 
different forces motivate generosity in religious and secular spheres. The importance of 
disaggregating philanthropy in this way has been confirmed by several recent studies, such as 
Wang and Graddy (2008), List (2011), Showers et al. (2011), and Helms and Thornton (2012). 
Second, where previous studies of charitable giving and religiosity do consider disaggregated 
measures of giving, they often estimate religious giving and secular giving separately (Lunn, 
Klay, and Douglass, 2011; Brown and Ferris, 2007; Eckel and Grossman, 2004; Brooks, 2004; 
Hrung, 2004; Bekkers and Schuyt, 2008). This might cause inefficient and biased estimates 
                                                          
11
 A less commonly used term for religiosity is “religiousness.” Religiosity describes how religious an individual is, 
regardless of what type of religion he or she follows. 
12
 Secular giving represents giving to non-religious organizations, such as those in education, human services, and 
health. 
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because there is no accounting for unobserved characteristics (e.g., tastes or attitudes toward 
money) when estimating the separate models. However, religious and secular giving are likely to 
be statistically correlated since a given individual likely receives similar “warm glows” from 
both types of giving. Due to these unobserved individual characteristics, it is more appropriate to 
model charitable giving to different causes as a simultaneous system. Finally, although a handful 
of previous studies use bivariate or multivariate regression models, the interpretations of the 
results are often problematic, as they examine the resulting coefficients and not the more 
appropriate marginal effects. As a result of these methodological shortcomings, the causal 
relationship between religiosity and charitable giving is far from clear. 
To overcome those problems, this study uses bivariate probit (BVP) and bivariate tobit 
(BVT) models to control for the potential correlation between religious giving and secular giving 
by the same individual and then draws appropriate interpretations. Through this approach, 
efficiency is gained due to a statistically significant correlation between the two types of giving 
(𝜌=0.397 (0.028), 𝑝-value=0.000). The results show that, compared with less-religious people, 
religious people are 25% more likely to give and also give an average of $1,028 more to 
religious organizations. Religious people also give more generously to secular organizations: 
they are 3% likelier to donate and give an average of $446 more per year compared with less-
religious people. The estimated effects of religiosity differ across the different bivariate systems 
and separate models, suggesting that studies that do not control for correlations between different 
types of giving yield unreliable estimates of the causal effect of religiosity on giving. 
Curiously however, why religious people are more generous than non-religious people? 
According to Wuthnow (1991) and Bekkers and Schuyt (2008), religion motivates people to give 
more generously because it creates a social context in which people are not only more aware of 
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opportunities to give and more likely to be asked to give but also encourage one another to 
engage in charity. Additionally, religion can shape an individual’s opinions about morality, 
increase their concern for others’ wellbeing, foster trust in fellow citizens, and evoke feelings of 
responsibility for others. For religious people, giving to charity is thus similar to buying a “self-
image” (Andreoni, 2006). Despite these arguments, theoretical justifications for a causal 
relationship between religiosity and charitable giving are limited. Therefore, by extending the 
framework of Brooks (2004) and Dellavigna, List, and Malmendier (2012), this study contributes 
to the existing literature by offering a firmer theoretical foundation.  
Besides the mixed findings on the causal relationship between religiosity and charitable 
giving, another interesting debate in the literature on charitable giving surrounds the gender 
difference in giving. For example, Andreoni et al. (2001), Rooney et al. (2005), Mesch et al. 
(2006, 2011), and Piper and Schnepf (2008) reach diverse conclusions regarding variations 
between men and women in terms of charitable giving (i.e., some report that women are more 
generous than men, while others report the opposite). In contrast, Einolf (2011) and Lo and 
Tashiro (2013) argue that the gender difference in giving is small or non-existent, and Cox and 
Deck (2006) suggest that the gender difference is not clear-cut and depends on the decision 
context. This debate is worth investigating in terms of its interaction with the impact of 
religiosity on giving. Even if religious people have a greater propensity to give as well as higher 
levels of charitable giving, it remains unknown whether highly religious men and women are 
equally generous in giving. If this gender difference exists, then is it smaller among the more 
religious who are, in general, generous donors? Are men and women equally generous when 
different levels of giving are considered? If, on the other hand, there is no gender difference in 
giving, then is it necessarily true that there is also no difference between religious men and 
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women and between less-religious men and women? Given these open questions at the 
intersection of religiosity and gender, this study investigates gender differences in charitable 
giving for donor groups with different levels of religiosity. In so doing, it demonstrates that 
previous empirical analyses of gender differences in giving masked important differences among 
donor groups with different levels of religiosity.  
To disentangle the effects of gender on the decision to donate and the donation amount, 
this study uses a zero-inflated ordered probit (ZIOP) model, first proposed by Harris and Zhao 
(2007). The impact of gender on the two decisions (whether to donate and how much to donate) 
could differ in both magnitude and sign; failure to disentangle these varying effects of gender on 
generosity could bias the estimation. Therefore this paper attempts to reduce, if not eliminate, 
such bias by using a ZIOP model to distinguish the decision to donate from the decision of how 
much to donate. To do so, the analysis divides an individual’s decision-making process into two 
stages. In stage one, she decides whether to participate in the charitable giving market; if she 
chooses not to participate, she donates zero. Having decided to participate, an individual then 
decides how much to donate in stage two. However, the donation could still be zero because of a 
current high price of giving or low income. Given the existence of two different types of zeroes, 
a fundamental problem arises with the probit and ordered probit methodologies: traditional probit 
models cannot disentangle differential influences on the decision to participate and how much to 
contribute, which may bias the estimates. This study is the first known attempt to decompose the 
decision-making process if the level of charitable giving is ordered discretely. Similarly, no 
analysis of charitable giving has thus far used the ZIOP approach. The use of the model here thus 
marks perhaps the most important contribution of this study to the literature on charitable giving. 
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2.2 Conceptual Framework 
Previous studies have investigated the various motivations that lead people to give to 
charity. Generally, two types of benefits from charitable giving are documented. Public benefits 
refer to any potential benefit that a donor may receive from improving the charitable 
organization’s total output. By contrast, private benefits represent any potential benefit that is not 
related to the level of the charitable organization’s output (Vesterlund 2006). Donors receive 
private benefits in many ways. For instance, giving to charity may make them feel generous and 
that they have fulfilled their obligations of giving back to society. It may also raise donors’ 
reputations and prestige (Harbaugh 1998). Andreoni (1990) labels these potential private benefits 
as “warm glow.” 
Following Harbaugh (1998), this study assumes that the level of the charitable 
organization’s total output does not affect donors’ utility of giving and that an individual’s 
donation is not influenced by other donors’ contribution decisions.13 People experience a warm 
glow when giving to charity. 
Suppose individuals have separable preferences, in which each good is classified together 
with similar goods.
14
 Each consumption good other than charitable donations is included into the 
aggregated consumption good (𝑥), and all charitable giving can be classified into a donation 
good (𝑔). The preference ordering of various types of charitable giving, conditional on the 
                                                          
13
 Most empirical studies that use survey data show that the benefit people receive from charitable giving is private 
in nature (Vesterlund 2006). For instance, Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) find that people increase their donations 
because of private benefits, especially when there are many donors. 
14
 The two-stage decision-making process and separable preferences are not exactly the same thing. However 
(weakly) separable preferences are both necessary and sufficient for the second stage. Therefore, while separable 
preferences do not imply the two-stage decision-making process, the two-stage decision-making process does imply 
weak separability (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980). 
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consumption of the consumption goods not in this set, is (weakly) independent of the 
consumption levels of those other goods.
15
 
To maximize utility, assume an individual has a separable utility function of the form: 
Max 𝑈(𝑥, 𝑔) = 𝑢(𝑥) + (𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑟)𝑣(𝑔)  s.t. 𝑝𝑥 + 𝑔 = 𝑚   
where the relative price of “all other consumption goods” is 𝑝 and the price of “charitable giving” 
is numeraire. The utility function satisfies standard concavity properties such that 𝑢′(∙) ≥ 0, 
𝑣′(∙) ≥ 0, 𝑢′′(∙) < 0, and 𝑣′′(∙) < 0. It is also assumed that 𝛼0>0 in order to avoid the corner 
solution.
16
 Here, 𝑟 captures the degree of religiosity for an individual, where 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1.17 
With 𝑟 = 0, the utility maximization problem for a perfectly secular individual (𝑆) is 
Max 𝑈𝑆(𝑥, 𝑔) =  𝑢(𝑥) + 𝛼0𝑣(𝑔)  s.t. 𝑝𝑥 + 𝑔 = 𝑚 
With 𝑟 = 1, the utility maximization problem for a perfectly religious individual (𝑅) is  
Max 𝑈𝑅(𝑥, 𝑔) =  𝑢(𝑥) + (𝛼0 + 𝛼1)𝑣(𝑔)  s.t. 𝑝𝑥 + 𝑔 = 𝑚 
So 𝛼0 and (𝛼0 + 𝛼1) represents the importance of giving for a perfectly secular individual and a 
perfectly religious individual, respectively. If 𝛼1 > 0 , the religious individual puts more 
emphasis on giving. Conversely, if 𝛼1 < 0, the religious individual puts less emphasis on giving. 
The utility for an individual is maximized when 
𝑈𝑔
𝑈𝑥
=
𝑝𝑔
𝑝𝑥
=
1
𝑝
. Thus, using the above 
utility function, it can be shown that 
𝑈𝑔
𝑆 = 𝛼0𝑣𝑔 − 𝑢𝑥/𝑝;   𝑈𝑥
𝑆 = 𝑢𝑥 − 𝛼0𝑝𝑣𝑔 
𝑈𝑔
𝑅 = (𝛼0 + 𝛼1)𝑣𝑔 − 𝑢𝑥/𝑝;   𝑈𝑥
𝑅 = 𝑢𝑥 − (𝛼0 + 𝛼1)𝑝𝑣𝑔 
                                                          
15
 Suppose the consumer first divides total expenditure between these two categories and then shares the category-
level expenditure across the different items in that group. 
16
 When 𝛼0=0, giving to charity would decrease the agent’s total utility, and a “corner solution” would arise. Since 
the tangency condition is not satisfied, the individual is willing to substitute away charitable donations for an extra 
unit of all other goods. The scenario that an individual dislikes charitable giving is not included in this study. 
17
 In the dataset used in the empirical analysis, people’s religiosity is denoted as either a “0” or a “1”. 
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It is clear that when 𝛼1 > 0,  𝑀𝑈𝑔
𝑆 < 𝑀𝑈𝑔
𝑅 and 𝑀𝑈𝑥
𝑆 > 𝑀𝑈𝑥
𝑅. 
Therefore we know that by consuming the optimal bundle (𝑥𝑆
∗(𝑝,𝑚), 𝑔𝑆
∗(𝑝,𝑚)) solved by 
the perfectly secular individual, the perfectly religious individual is not utility-maximized. This 
indicates that, given the market price ratio, the perfectly religious individual is more likely to be 
willing to trade away more of the consumption good for additional giving to charity. In this case, 
the perfectly religious individual would be better off by choosing to consume another 
consumption bundle 𝑥𝑅
∗(𝑝,𝑚)  and 𝑔𝑅
∗ (𝑝,𝑚) , where 𝑥𝑅
∗ (𝑝,𝑚) < 𝑥𝑆
∗(𝑝,𝑚), and 𝑔𝑅
∗ (𝑝,𝑚) >
𝑔𝑆
∗(𝑝,𝑚). Thus, a perfectly religious individual, in general, will spend more of his income on 
charitable giving than a secular individual. 
Now consider a more general case. For an individual with a given degree of religiosity, 
( 0 < 𝑟 < 1) , the first-order condition with respect to charitable giving 𝑔  is 𝑈𝑔 = (𝛼0 +
𝛼1𝑟)𝑣𝑔 − 𝑢𝑥/𝑝 = 0. Differentiating 𝑈𝑔 with respect to 𝑟 yields 𝑈𝑔𝑟 =
𝜕𝑈𝑔
𝜕𝑟
= 𝛼1𝑣𝑔. Since finding 
an optimum requires that 𝑈′′(∙) < 0, it is the case that 𝑈𝑔𝑔 < 0. By using the Implicit Function 
Theorem, we can then derive 
when 𝛼1 < 0,    
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑟
= −
𝑈𝑔𝑟
𝑈𝑔𝑔
= (−) [
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(−)
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(−)
] < 0, and 
when 𝛼1 > 0,   
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑟
= −
𝑈𝑔𝑟
𝑈𝑔𝑔
= (−) [
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(−)
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(−)
] > 0 
When 𝛼1 > 0 , it implies that a religious individual who has a larger 𝑟  has a higher 
preference for charitable giving compared with an individual who has a smaller 𝑟 . Thus, 
according to the hypothesis that people with higher religiosity are more generous, we expect to 
see empirical estimates of 𝛼1 > 0.  
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2.3 Data 
The cross-sectional charitable giving dataset used in this study comes from the 2001 
“Giving and Volunteering in the United States” survey, which was conducted on 4,178 U.S. 
households.
18,19
 The survey collected data on various types of charitable giving, demographics, 
and household economic variables. One advantage of this dataset is that it categorizes 
destinations for charitable giving into religious organizations, youth development, education, 
health services, human services, political campaigns, and international programs as well as less-
formal giving to relatives, friends, neighbors, and strangers. These variables are available in both 
discrete and continuous formats (i.e., indicating both the existence of giving and the amount 
given), allowing researchers to use both multivariate probit and multivariate tobit systems 
(including bivariate models) to study the relationship between religiosity and charitable giving.
20
 
To align to the bivariate models, this study names giving to religious organizations as religious 
giving and generates a secular giving measure by summing all non-religious giving (e.g., giving 
to youth development, education, health services, and human services). Since the survey used the 
most extensive and detailed method of collecting the data, this study is able to generate estimates 
                                                          
18
 This survey was a random digit dial (RDD) telephone survey conducted by Westat for Independent Sector and 
provided by the Center on Wealth and Philanthropy at Boston College. Less than 5% of respondents did not answer 
a question (i.e., a “don’t know” or refused response).  
19
 The survey respondent was the household head; his/her responses are assumed to represent all household 
members. 
20
 Standard grid-based numerical approximations exist for univariate and bivariate problems, and although the 
Geweke, Hajivassiliou, and Keane method offers a common approach for simulation-based evaluation of the 
outcome probabilities in discrete choice models, the computational costs associated with these approaches rise 
exponentially with dimensionality (Jeliazkov and Lee, 2010). This study initially examined an eight-equation system, 
for which coefficients and marginal effects of the multivariate probit model were obtained via STATA and R, 
respectively. However, the marginal effects of the multivariate tobit model could not be calculated due to the 
difficulty in iteration. Therefore, this study uses bivariate probit and tobit models; future work will focus on using 
multivariate approaches to investigate these relationships. 
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of the relationships between household characteristics and giving that are more accurate than 
those produced through less extensive methods (Bekkers and Wiepking, 2006).
21
  
However, the dataset has limitations. First, it does not include the religious affiliation for 
each respondent. However, religiosity depends only on how religious an individual is, not what 
type of religion he or she follows; as such, this study investigates the impact of religiosity on 
charitable giving regardless of the respondent’s religious affiliation. Second, the measurement of 
religiosity is dichotomous. Although it is unfortunate that a fuller scale is not available, a binary 
measurement of religiosity is still worthy of investigation because this study is able to account 
for the unobserved individual characteristics that vary between religious and secular giving.
22
  
 The final sample contains 3,928 observations; 3,356 (85%) of these reported charitable 
giving in the year when the survey was conducted, with an average level of $3,093. From the raw 
data, a binary measure of religiosity is constructed based on the respondent’s level of religious 
involvement. The “religious” group includes respondents who report attending religious services 
every week or nearly every week; the “less-religious” group contains the respondents who report 
not being active in religious activities and services, including those who attend religious services 
once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never. The first category contains 43% of 
respondents (religiosity=1), with the remaining 57% in the less-religious category 
(religiosity=0).
23
 Table 1 shows that 88% of religious people donate to charity, giving an average 
                                                          
21
 Similar to the “method + area” modules in the “Giving in the Netherlands Panel Survey” listed in Bekkers and 
Wiepking 2006, respondents participating in this survey were given a list of seven methods (payroll, mail, phone, 
TV or radio request, religious organizations, street collections, and other methods) that could be used to donate 
money. Respondents indicated whether they donated any money to charity via each method. They were also given a 
list of sectors (e.g., religious, education, youth development, health, and human services) to which they could donate. 
Respondents indicated whether their household had donated money to each sector and, if so, how much. 
22
 If data is available, future research will study the causal relationship between religiosity and giving using the 
bivariate (or multivariate) system and a more detailed measure of religiosity. 
23
 One limitation of this dataset is that the measure of religiosity is binary (either 0 or 1). A measure of religiosity 
with various rankings would aid future research. 
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of $3,719. In contrast, 84% of less-religious people choose to give, with the average total 
donation being only $2,603.  
 
Table 1. Statistics Description, by Religiosity 
 
Panel A:  
Giving by All-respondent Sample and by Religiosity (Percentage) 
 
All sample 
(N=3,928) 
Religious Sample 
(N=1,689) 
Less-religious Sample 
(N=2,239) 
Total giving 0.8544(0.3528) 0.8805(0.3244) 0.8350(0.3713) 
Religious Giving 0.6281(0.4834) 0.9002(0.2998) 0.4259(0.4946) 
Secular Giving 0.8651(0.3417) 0.8907(0.3121) 0.8461(0.3610) 
 
Panel B: 
Giving by All-respondent Sample and by Religiosity (in Dollars) 
 
All sample 
(N=3,928) 
Religious Sample 
(N=1,689) 
Less-religious Sample 
(N=2,239) 
Total giving 2,642.59(8,207.85) 3,274.47(8,047.57) 2,173.31(8,295.56) 
Religious Giving 868.83(1,949.20) 1,759.66(2,619.65) 264.15(904.24) 
Secular Giving 1,967.51(8,083.60) 1,925.40(7,728.83) 1,996.91(8,324.06) 
 
Panel C: 
Giving by All-respondent Sample and by Religiosity among Donors (in Dollars) 
 
All sample 
(N=3,928) 
Religious Sample 
(N=1,689) 
Less-religious 
Sample 
(N=2,239) 
Total giving 3,093.00(8,801.20) 3,718.77(8,479.59) 2,602.89(9,017.05) 
Religious Giving 971.17(2,036.57) 1,849.74(2,654.69) 308.54(970.26) 
Secular Giving 2,192.57(8,504.58) 2,039.66(7,940.34) 2,309.10(8,911.08) 
 
Notes:
 1. 
Standard deviations are in the parentheses.
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 Since the survey was conducted at the household level, each household is represented by 
either a male or a female respondent. However, for identifying gender-based differences in 
charitable giving, the married observations cannot be used. For married respondents, decisions 
surrounding charitable giving are typically not those of a single individual, since married men 
and women jointly negotiate charitable giving. Thus, the responses of married respondents are 
likely to also reflect their spouses’ preferences (Andreoni et al., 2003; Yoruk 2009; Li 2014), 
complicating the identification of gender differences in giving. Following Andreoni et al. (2003), 
this study thus only uses information from single men and single women to investigate gender-
based differences in charitable giving. After the marital status restriction, the subsample used for 
studying gender differences contains 1,607 individuals, 609 of whom are single men.  
 
Table 2. Giving by gender 
 
 
Propensity of 
giving 
Amount of 
giving 
Amount of 
giving among 
donors 
Giving as a 
share of 
income 
Men 0.83 1,831 2,209 0.046 
Women 0.82 1,671 2,036 0.054 
Religious Men 0.90 2,591 2,874 0.068 
Religious Women 0.87 2,051 2,354 0.067 
Less-religious Men 0.81 1,601 1,983 0.039 
Less-religious Women 0.78 1,336 1,722 0.043 
 
          
Notes: 
1. 
Amount of giving and the amount of giving among donors are in the level of dollars.  
      2. 
Propensity of giving and the giving as a share of income are in ratios. 
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 Within this sample, as shown in Table 2, 83% of men and 82% of women give to charity. 
Among donors, the average amounts given by men and women are $2,209 and $2,036, 
respectively, representing 4.6% and 5.4% of their respective incomes. Among those who report 
being actively religious (religiosity=1), 90% of men and 87% of women make charitable 
donations. The average amount given is $2,874 for male donors and $2,354 for female donors. 
Among those not actively involved in religious activities (religiosity=0), 81% of men and 78% of 
women report charitable giving, with average annual donations of $1,983 and $1,722 for men 
and women, respectively.  
The median level of giving among donors is $825 for the full sample, $1,325 for the 
religious group, and $500 for the less-religious group. The 95
th
 percentile of giving is $9,825 for 
the full sample, $11,000 for the religious group, and $8,100 for the less-religious group. Based 
on this, a categorical measure of giving is established: $1–999 is considered low-level giving, 
$1,000–9,999 is considered mid-level giving, and $10,000 and above is considered high-level 
giving. With the threshold parameters (i.e., cut points) significant at the 1% significance level, 
annual donation amounts from single individuals are thus divided into four ordered levels: 
nothing (g=0); $1–999 (g=1); $1,000–9,999 (g=2); and $10,000 and above (g=3).24 From Table 3, 
approximately 18% of respondents report donating nothing.
25
 This group may include people 
who make no charitable contributions regardless of market conditions as well as infrequent 
donors who donated nothing in the study year but may have donated in the past and may again in 
the future; some of these are potential donors who would donate if the price of giving to charity 
                                                          
24
 The results vary little if six ranges of giving (zero; $1–499; $500–999; $1,000–3,999; $4,000–9,999; and $10,000 
and above) are used. Robustness check results are available upon request. 
25
 This is a smaller proportion than the case studied by Harris and Zhao (2007), but this 18% still represents a 
substantial number of zero observations for the ZIOP model. The superiority of the ZIOP model is shown in Table 6 
and discussed in Section V.  
   
23 
 
fell.
26,27
 Table A1 of the appendix describes and provides descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the empirical models. 
 
Table 3. Levels of  Charitable Giving for Single Individuals 
      Level of Charitable 
Giving (g) 
Proportion Standard Error [95 percent Confidence Interval] 
0 0.1761 0.0095 0.1575                    0.1947 
1 0.4549 0.0124 0.4305                    0.4793 
2 0.3416 0.0118 0.3184                    0.3648 
3 0.0274 0.0041 0.0194                    0.0354 
 
          
 
Notes: 
1.
 Nothing (g=0);  
$1–999 (g=1);  
$1000–9999 (g=2);  
$10,000 and above (g=3).  
 
 
2.4 Analysis: Religiosity and Generosity 
 
2.4.1    Econometric Methodology 
To investigate whether more religious people are more generous in terms of higher giving 
incidences and donation amounts, this study uses the bivariate probit and bivariate tobit models. 
This circumvents the problem that may arise when using separate probit or tobit models to test 
whether people with high religiosity are more generous. Separate models ignore the potential 
correlations among donations to different types of charities from the same individual that are not 
reflected in observable characteristics (Ramful and Zhao, 2009). Owing to unobserved 
characteristics, such as individual tastes or attitudes toward money, the probabilities of an 
                                                          
26
 According to Harris and Zhao (2007), some respondents may prefer to identify themselves as non-donors for 
specific reasons, but this possibility is not considered in the present study. 
27
 The price of giving in the literature is defined as one minus the marginal tax rate, but no price of giving is used in 
this study. 
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individual giving (and the amount given) to different types of charities are likely related through 
error terms. 
 
Table 4. Correlations between Religious Giving and Secular Giving 
 
 
Rho(religious, secular) 
 
Coefficient 
 
Standard Error 
 
t-stat 
 
P-value 
 
 
 
Panel A: 
Bivariate Probit—Propensities of making religious and secular giving 
 
(Tetrachoric) 𝜌 
 
0.3967 
 
0.02810 
 
14.118 
 
0.0000 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: 
Bivariate Tobit—Actual amount of religious and secular giving 
 
𝜌 
 
0.0466 
 
0.0182 
 
2.56 
 
0.0100 
 
 
 
Notes: 
1. 
Test of Ho: the propensity (or, amounts) of religious giving and the propensity of secular giving are 
independent. 
2. 
Normality assumption of errors. 
 
Table 4 presents the correlation between the propensity for religious giving and the 
propensity for secular giving and the corresponding correlation for the donation levels. Both 
correlations are positive and statistically significant, indicating that the BVP and BVT are 
appropriate ways to model the interdependence of religious and secular giving. The hypothesis 
that giving to religious organizations is independent of giving to secular organizations can be 
rejected at the 1% level (𝜌=0.397(0.028), 𝑝-value=0.000), suggesting that unobserved individual 
characteristics that affect an individual’s decision to give to religious organizations also affect 
his/her decision to give to secular causes. Therefore, the BVP system is used when double binary 
decisions by the same individual are involved. 
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The general specification for this bivariate binary choice model can be written as 
𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
∗ = 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜃1 ∙ 𝑍1
′ + 𝜀1 
𝑦𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟
∗ = 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝜃2 ∙ 𝑍2
′ + 𝜀2 
With  𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 = {
0      if 𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
∗ ≤ 0
1      if 𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
∗ > 0
, and  𝑦𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 = {
0      if 𝑦𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟
∗ ≤ 0
1      if 𝑦𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟
∗ > 0
 
where 𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
∗  and 𝑦𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟
∗  are the unobserved variables that represent the latent probabilities 
or incidences that an individual chooses to give to religious and secular organizations, 
respectively. 𝛽𝑖 is the impact of religiosity on charitable giving, and Zi represents other observed 
characteristics that are relevant to the decision-making process, including education level and 
other standard socio-demographic variables such as income, marital status, age, gender, and 
residence.
28
 𝜃1 and 𝜃2are vectors of parameters of interest. The joint distribution of the error 
terms ε1  and ε2  follows a bivariate normal distribution. The BVT regression, in which the 
dependent variables are continuous measures of charitable giving to various categories 
(measured in thousands of dollars), is estimated following a similar procedure to that described 
for the BVP.
29
 
 
2.4.2   Empirical Results 
The impact of religiosity on charitable giving is examined via the BVP model for giving 
propensity and the BVT model for the donation amount.
30
 Table 5 presents the impact of 
religiosity on religious and secular giving.  
                                                          
28
 Sample statistics for these variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
29 
Another measure of donation amount is as a share of income (i.e., total donations divided by annual pre-tax 
income), which takes into account the potential income/wealth gap that may exist by religiosity. However, to be 
consistent with the literature, this study uses only the donation amount in dollars. 
30
 The full regression results from both estimations are presented in the appendix. 
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The marginal effects from the BVP suggest that religiosity positively influences both 
types of donations, providing evidence that greater religious involvement increases the likelihood 
of giving to charity. In addition, the results of the BVT model suggest that a religious individual 
donates more, on average, than a less-religious individual. These findings are consistent with 
many previous studies but provide uniquely unbiased and efficient estimates. Interestingly, the 
impact of religiosity on religious and secular giving is smaller than expected after taking into 
account the correlation between different types of giving. 
Religious people are almost 25% likelier than less-religious people to donate to religious 
causes, giving $1,029 more annually. Additionally, they are 3% likelier to give to secular causes 
and donate $446 more per year. Importantly, the effect of religiosity differs between the bivariate 
systems and the separate models.  
For instance, the total marginal effect of religiosity on the propensity for secular giving in 
the bivariate probit model is only half that of the separate probit models and the estimated impact 
of religiosity on the propensity for secular giving is 6.3 percentage points higher. Accounting for 
the correlation between religious and secular giving, this study estimates only a 3% higher 
chance of secular giving because religiosity has a positive direct effect but a negative indirect 
effect, and these are entangled when the bivariate probit model is not used. The direct effect of 
religiosity on the probability of secular giving is 0.048, and the indirect effect (through religious 
giving) is -0.017. These effects offset each other, yielding a total effect of about 0.03. This 
therefore indicates that previous studies that do not control for correlations between different 
types of giving will reach unreliable estimates of the causal effect of religiosity on charitable 
giving. 
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Table 5. Impact of Religiosity on Charitable Giving 
 
 
Panel A: 
Probit Specification—Propensities of making religious and secular giving 
 
 
Religiosity (higher religious involvement) 
 
Single Probit Bivariate Probit 
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient Marginal Effect 
  
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Religious 
Giving 
0.7180***        
(0.0434)                
0.2658***        
(0.0156)                
0.7182***        
(0.0435)                
0.2651***        
(0.0160)                
-0.0120 
***       
(0.0023)                
0.2531***        
(0.0159)                
Secular 
Giving 
0.3642***        
(0.0551)                
0.0632***        
(0.0098)                
0.3623***        
(0.0556)                
0.0475***        
(0.0075)                
-0.0170***        
(0.0020)                
0.0304***        
(0.0077)                
 
Panel B: 
Tobit Specification—Amounts of religious and secular giving 
 
 
Religiosity (higher religious involvement) 
 
Single Tobit Bivariate Tobit 
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect  
Coefficients         Marginal Effect 
Religious 
Giving 
1.4791***                  
(0.0952)                 
0.7170***                  
(0.0453)                 
1.3522***                  
(0.1032)                 
1.0288***                  
(0.0979)                  
Secular 
Giving 
0.9881***                  
(0.2957)                 
0.5360***                  
(0.1599)                 
0.6969*                  
(0.4050)                   
0.4458**                  
(0.2247)                  
 
Notes: 
1.
 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
2.
 For Bivariate Tobit model, the dependent variable is measured in thousands of dollars. The explanatory variables 
in the BVP and BVT models are gender, age, race, residency, marital status, education, and family size. The full 
results for both models are presented in separate tables (A2, A3, A4, and A5) in the Appendix. 
3.
 Marginal effects from the BVP model, including direct effects and indirect effects are provided by LimDep. 
Marginal effects from the BVT model are calculated using Delta Method. 
4.
 Direct Effect is the derivatives of 𝐸[𝑦1|𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑦2 = 1] with respect to 𝑋1; 
Indirect Effect is the derivatives of 𝐸[𝑦1|𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑦2 = 1] with respect to 𝑋2. 
The Marginal Effects is the sum of the two derivative vectors. 
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After accounting for the correlation between giving to religious and secular causes, 
religious and less-religious people differ in their behavior surrounding both religious and secular 
donations (Table 5). Religiosity thus positively affects the likelihood of charitable giving as well 
as the donation amount. As discussed in Bekkers and Schuyt (2008), charitable contributions to 
religious causes can largely be explained by the social context created by the religious 
environment (the “community” explanation), while the internalized social values such as trust, 
equality, and social responsibility (the “conviction” explanation) explain the secular 
contributions. Because religious involvement significantly increases donations to both religious 
and secular causes, the motivation behind this generosity is not limited to a sense of religious 
duty or the norms of the religious environment. Other factors, such as attitude towards money 
(Wiepking and Breeze, 2011) and social pressure (Dellavigna et al., 2012) should be considered. 
 
 
2.5 Analysis: Gender and Generosity 
2.5.1   Econometric Methodology  
 
Inspired by Harris and Zhao (2007), this present study supposes that two charitable 
giving regimes exist. Regime 0 represents non-participants in the charitable giving market, and 
Regime 1 represents participants. Let the binary variable 𝜏 denote the division between these two 
regimes. In other words, 𝜏 = 0 represents non-participants, while 𝜏 = 1 represents participants, 
including donors who give positive amounts to charity, and donors who currently give nothing to 
charity but may give to charity under the right market conditions. 
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The participation model (also known as the split probit model), which analyzes the 
dichotomous decision of individuals to participate in charitable giving activities, can be written 
as 
τ∗ = z′γ + ε 
where the latent variable 𝜏∗ , which is the first underlying latent variable in the whole data-
generating process, represents the propensity for participation, vector 𝑧 represents the factors that 
affect the participation decision, vector γ  represents the unknown coefficients, and ε  is the 
standard normally distributed error term. As pointed out by Harris and Zhao (2007), the mapping 
between 𝜏∗ and 𝜏 is given by 
𝜏 = {
0      if τ∗ ≤ 0
1      if τ∗ > 0
 
The probability of an individual being in Regime 1 is given by (Maddala 1983) 
Prob(𝜏 = 1|z) = Prob(τ∗ > 0|z) = Φ(z′γ) 
Accordingly, the probability of an individual falling into Regime 0 is 
Prob(τ = 0|z) = Prob(τ∗ ≤ 0|z) = 1 − Φ(z′γ) 
where Φ(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
Assume participation status is conditioned on 𝜏 = 1; thus, different participation levels 
can be represented by a consumption model (also known as the ordered probit model): 
∗= x′β + μg
~  
In this consumption model, ∗g
~  is the underlying latent variable of  g
~ , which is an ordered discrete 
variable generated by the so-called ordered probit model. Note that  g
~  is related to its latent 
dependent variable ∗g
~  by the following mapping (Harris and Zhao 2007): 
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 g
~ =
{
 
 
 
 0                                if ∗g
~ ≤ 0
1                  if δ0 < ∗g
~ ≤ δ1    
2                  if δ1 < ∗g
~ ≤ δ2    
3                             if δ2 ≤ ∗g
~
 
The vector x in the consumption model represents the explanatory variables that 
determine the various levels of donations once people choose to contribute.
31
 The vector 𝛽 
contains the unknown coefficients and 𝜇 is the standard normally distributed error term. 𝛿 is the 
vector of boundary parameters that are estimated together with the vector of unknown 
parameters 𝛽.32 
The probability of a particular level of charitable giving, under the ordered probit model, 
can then be written as (Maddala 1983) 
Prob( = j|x, τ = 1 ) =g
~ Φ(δj − x
′β) − Φ(δj−1 − x
′β) 
where j ∈ [1,   J − 1] 
When people decide to give to charity, the decisions on whether to give and how much to 
give are made jointly. This implies that the parameters 𝜏 and  g
~  cannot be observed individually 
in terms of a zero donation, as described earlier. In this case, as pointed out by Harris and Zhao 
(2007), 𝜏 and  g
~  can only be observed by using the following criteria: 
g = τ ∗   g
~  
Therefore, we can derive that 
g = x′β + μ 
g =
{
 
 
 
 0                                   if  g
~ ≤ 0    or    τ = 0
1                      if δ0 <  g
~ ≤ δ1     or    τ = 1
2                      if δ1 <  g
~ ≤ δ2     or    τ = 1
3                               if δ2 ≤  g
~      or    τ = 1
 
                                                          
31
  The vectors x and z defined previously may differ since there is no requirement that the x vector equals the z 
vector. 
32
  Following Harris and Zhao (2007), μ
0
 is assumed to be zero throughout the analysis. 
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If, for now, we assume that the two error terms 𝜀 and 𝜇 from the participation model and 
the consumption model are uncorrelated, then the full probabilities for the observed donation 𝑔 
of the ZIOP model can be written as (Harris and Zhao 2007) 
Prob(g) = {
Prob(g = 0|x, z) = Prob(τ = 0|z) + Prob(τ = 1|z) ∗ Prob( = 0|x, τ = 1)g
~
Prob(g = j|x, z) = Prob(τ = 1|z) ∗ Prob( = j|x, τ = 1)g
~
Prob(g = J|x, z) = Prob(τ = 1|z) ∗ Prob( = J|x, τ = 1)g
~
 
where j ∈ [1,   3] 
which is,  
Prob(g) = {
         Prob(g = 0|x, z) = [1 − Φ(z′γ)] + Φ(z′γ) ∗ Φ(−x′β)
                    Prob(g = j|x, z) = Φ(z′γ) ∗ [Φ(δj − x
′β) − Φ(δj−1 − x
′β)]
Prob(g = J|x, z) = Φ(z′γ) ∗ [1 − Φ(δJ−1 − x
′β)]
 
where j ∈ [1,   3] 
In the next step, this study uses the maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the 
unknowns. Thus, the related log likelihood function can be written as (Harris and Zhao 2007) 
ℓ(θ) =∑Ijln [Prob(g = j|z, x, θ)]
J
j=0
 
where I(∙) is the indicator function, which equals 1 if an individual chooses to contribute at level 
j (j=0, 1, 2, 3) and 0 otherwise. 
 
2.5.2   Empirical Results  
In this section, the analysis adds to the literature on gender differences in charitable 
giving by explicitly investigating the role of religiosity. Using the ZIOP approach, the results 
demonstrate that previous empirical studies have masked important differences among donor 
groups with different levels of religiosity. The superiority of using the ZIOP model in this study 
can be examined by various tests (e.g., LR, Vuong non-nested test, Hausman, a small Monte 
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Carlo simulation using the data, and information criteria).
33
 Table 6 compares the information 
criteria between the traditional ordered probit (OP) model and the ZIOP. The information criteria 
(AIC, BIC, and HQIC) consistently indicate that the ZIOP model is a better fit than the OP 
model. 
 
Table 6. 
Information Criteria Comparison between OP Model and ZIOP Model  
 
    OP ZIOP 
µ 1 
 
1.3565*** 2.9201*** 
µ 2 
 
3.1107*** 4.8843*** 
log likelihood 
 
-1706.85      -1571.54      
Info. Criterion AIC 
 
2.1405      1.9895      
Finite Sample AIC 
 
2.1406      1.9901      
Info. Criterion BIC 
 
2.1840      2.0799      
Info. Criterion HQIC   2.1566      2.0230      
 
Notes: 
1. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
2.
 µ 1 
and µ 2 are threshold parameters. 
 
As mentioned by Harris and Zhao (2007), the marginal effects of the ZIOP model 
combine the effects of the participation decision with those of the donation amount. Marginal 
effects that consider the “zeroes” coming from two different sources—non-participation and 
current zero donation—are presented for both the overall estimation and the subsample 
estimations.
34
 
                                                          
33
 The author thanks Mark Harris for suggesting these tests for the superiority of the ZIOP model. 
34
 The ZIOP model assumes that the error terms from the two-stage models are uncorrelated, whereas the ZIOP 
model with correlation (ZIOPC model) assumes correlated disturbances. The results of this study indicate that both 
the ZIOP model and the ZIOPC model are superior to the OP model in terms of most of the criteria. Moreover, 
based on the AIC, BIC, and HQIC, the results consistently suggest that the ZIOP is a slightly better fit than the 
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Table 7 shows that charitable giving behaviors are not widely different between men and 
women, regardless of religiosity. In general, men are only 0.9% likelier than women to make 
small donations; in contrast, women are slightly more likely than men to make medium and large 
donations. None of these differences are statistically or economically significant: there are 
essentially no differences in the propensity of men and women to give to charity. To consider 
whether this changes when taking religiosity into account, religious and less-religious groups 
must be examined separately.  
 
2.5.2.1)   Religious Men and Women (Religiosity=1) 
In using the ZIOP model, this study assumes that men’s and women’s charitable giving 
decisions result from two distinct decisions: participation and level of giving, conditional on 
participation. These decisions can show opposite effects. For instance, religious men are 2.4% 
likelier than religious women to not participate in philanthropy; however, conditional on 
participation, religious men are slightly (0.2%) less likely than religious women to donate 
nothing. Those effects balance to yield a 2.2% higher chance of religious men reporting no 
donations to charities. Panel B of Table 7 reports that, considering low-level donations, religious 
men are 1.8% likelier to give than religious women. Although this difference is statistically 
significant, it is not significant from an economic standpoint. Additionally, when making both 
mid- and high-level donations, religious men and women behave identically in terms of giving 
propensity. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ZIOPC, even though their performance is similar. Therefore, only the results from the ZIOP regressions are shown 
and discussed in this paper. Additional results are available from the author upon request. 
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Table 7. Gender difference (Men vs. Women) in Propensity to Give—Marginal Effects 
 
Panel A: 
Zero Observations (including permanent and current non-givers) : g=0 
 Zero-Inflated Ordered Probit (ZIOP) Model 
 
Non-participants 
Therefore Donate Zero 
Participants Donate 
Zero Amount Due to 
Current Market 
Conditions 
Full Zero Observations 
 
Pr (τ=0)                 
              
Pr (τ=1,g ̃=0)                 
                 
Pr (g=0)                 
 
All Sample 0.0073 0.0009 
0.0081                        
(0.0088)                 
Religious 
Group 
0.0236 -0.0017 
0.0219*                        
(0.0125)                                        
Less-religious 
Group 
 
Number of 
Observations 
-0.0316 
 
 
-0.0224 
 
 
-0.0540***                      
(0.0099) 
       
    3,928                   
 
 
Panel B: 
Positive Observations (including three levels of giving: $1–999 (g=1); $1000–9999 (g=2) ; 
$10,000 and above (g=3) )  
 
Prob (g=1)                 
g=1 if $1–999 
Prob (g=2)                 
g=2 if $1,000–9,999 
Prob (g=3)                 
g=3 if over $10,000 
All Sample 
0.0091                   
(0.0075)                 
-0.0045                    
(0.0116)                 
-0.0002                      
(0.0014)                 
Religious Group 
0.0178***                    
(0.0007)    
-0.0058                     
(0.0195)     
0.0002                               
(0.0027)     
Less-eligious 
Group 
 
Number of 
Observations 
-0.0599***                     
(0.0231)  
 
3,928   
0.0350***                     
(0.0129) 
 
3,928    
0.0027*                               
(0.0015) 
 
3,928    
 
Notes: 
1.
 Dependent Variable: Propensity to Give to Ordered Levels of Giving. Independent Variable of Interest: 
Gender (=1 if Males)
 2. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 
5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
3. 
The explanatory variables in the traditional probit and ZIOP models 
are gender, age, race, residency, marital status, education, family size, attitude towards money, and confidence in 
charitable organizations. The full results for both models are presented in separate tables (A6, A7, and A8) in the 
Appendix. 
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2.5.2.2)   Less-religious Men and Women (Religiosity=0) 
The difference in giving is larger between less-religious men and women. Compared with 
less-religious women, less-religious men are 3.2% more likely to participate in philanthropy; 
when they participate, they are 2.2% more likely to make a non-zero donation. These two effects 
reinforce each other so that, for the less-religious donor group, women are 5.4% likelier to report 
zero giving to charity. This gender difference is larger than that in the religious group, in which 
men are 2.2% likelier than women to give nothing. Additionally, less-religious men and women 
show an opposite tendency than their religious counterparts in terms of zero donations, with 
women being more likely to give nothing. 
Less-religious men and women also behave differently than religious men and women in 
terms of low-level giving. Among highly religious people, men are 1.8% more likely to make 
small donations than women; in contrast, among less-religious people, women are 6% more 
likely to make small donations than men. In addition, although when making mid- and high-level 
donations, highly religious men and women behave similarly, the gender difference in the 
propensity to give to charity among less-religious individuals is statistically and economically 
significant. Panel B of Table 7 shows that less-religious men are 3.5% more likely to make mid-
level donations and 0.3% likelier to make large donations than less-religious women.  
In sum, less-religious women are likelier to make low-level donations to charities. In 
contrast, less-religious men are less likely to donate nothing and in general have higher 
propensities to give both at both middle and high levels. 
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2.6 Discussion and Policy Implications 
This study examines the impact of religiosity on generosity and empirically examines 
whether there are any gender-based differences in this. From a methodological standpoint, this 
study used bivariate probit and bivariate tobit models to control for the potential correlation 
between religious and secular giving owing to unobserved individual characteristics, thereby 
addressing the problem of inefficient estimates found in previous studies. Moreover, this study is 
the first to use a zero-inflated ordered probit model to distinguish the decision to participate in 
philanthropy and the donation level; this reduces the potential bias caused by treating decisions 
on charitable giving indifferently. In addition, to investigate the causal relationship between 
religiosity and charitable giving, this study added a theoretical framework to the existing 
literature. 
This study has two main results. First, religious people are more generous charitable 
givers: they have a greater propensity to give as well as higher levels of charitable giving to not 
only religious but also secular organizations. These findings are consistent with previous studies 
but provide uniquely unbiased and efficient estimates. The bivariate systems permit a test of the 
correlation across the different giving decisions, and the correlation between religious and 
secular giving is highly significant. After controlling for this correlation, the impacts of 
religiosity on religious and secular giving are smaller than expected. Second, highly religious 
men are 1.8% likelier to make small donations than highly religious women. However, highly 
religious men and women show no differences in terms of the probability of making medium- 
and large-sized donations. In contrast, less-religious women show a greater propensity (6%) to 
make small donations than their male counterparts, whereas less-religious men are more likely to 
make medium- and large-sized donations than their female counterparts.  
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These findings have certain implications for policymakers and fundraising organizations. 
Gender differences exist in the propensity to give when religiosity is taken into account. Since 
there are opposite gender-based differences for religious and less-religious individuals, charitable 
organizations can consider tailoring different fundraising plans. To attract more givers, charitable 
organizations could specifically solicit donations from highly religious men and less-religious 
women.   
38 
 
CHAPTER 3 
CHARITABLE GIVING BY MARRIED COUPLES: WHO IS 
PREVAILING IN THE BARGAINING? 
 
3.1 Charitable Giving Decision-making in Households 
Traditional models of family behavior are unitary--households are assumed to maximize 
the household’s utility function subject to its budget constraint. However, husbands and wives, 
both as individuals, have preferences over the allocation of resources within households. This 
correspondingly results in household bargaining in a manner of jointly deciding the allocation of 
resources (Pollak, 2005). A large body of research has focused on how married couples make 
financial decisions through household bargaining. Theoretical examples include Manser and 
Brown (1980), Lundberg and Pollak (1993), and Volger et al. (2006); on the other hand, typical 
empirical examples include Thomas (1990), Lundberg and Pollak (1996), and Browning and 
Chiappori (1998). However, little is known about the bargaining over decisions to give to 
charities within families. Who has relatively more bargaining power when the husband and the 
wife make joint decisions on donations? Does intra-household bargaining over charitable giving 
increase or reduce the amount of charitable contributions since bargaining can create either 
positive or negative externalities? Do gender roles matter? Most research on charitable giving 
assumes that decisions on charitable giving are a household’s decision that is unitary rather than 
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an individual’s decision. This is likely too strong an assumption, however (Samuelson, 1956).35 
 As a husband and the wife decide jointly over most household outcomes (e.g. new 
purchases, stock investments, and donations to charities), A household’s decision is normally 
made through bargaining, and the bargaining process depends on the balance of bargaining 
power between the husband and the wife. Essentially, household bargaining in general relies on 
gender differences in utility functions of the husband and the wife, and bargaining would be 
unnecessary otherwise (Addoum and Kung, 2011).  Extensive literature examines gender-based 
differences in giving to charities. Andreoni et al. (2001), Rooney et al. (2005), Mesch et al. (2006, 
2011), and Piper and Schnepf (2008) find evidences of males and females having their own 
giving preferences and habits. Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall (2003) suggest that when a couple 
has exactly identical preference towards a type of giving, donations to that type of giving would 
bring utility to both partners. Conversely, when a couple has perfectly opposing tastes in giving, 
each dollar given by a partner to a type of charity would create negative externalities experienced 
by the other partner. The negative externality is hence very likely to reduce donations. It is likely 
that a couple in marriages has greater similarity because marriage is assortative across factors 
such as education and religious faith. But household bargaining will exist in giving unless the 
couple’s tastes over giving are identical, and this bargaining is expected to be costly. 
According to Andreoni et al. (2003), the costly bargaining can be inframarginal. In this 
case, the couple might have conflicts in deciding whether or not to give to certain charities. The 
cost can also be marginal, for example, the cost can occur when deciding how much to give. 
Both types of costs potentially reduce the charitable giving by a household. Nonetheless, 
                                                          
35
 Because individuals within households have preferences, so aggregating individuals’ preferences into preferences 
of households leads to social choice problem (Samuelson, 1956). 
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bargaining is possible to be beneficial, and such a bargaining could save some time or costs 
associated with identifying where to donate, and whether and how much to donate.
36
 
 The results from the research existing on the intra-household bargaining over giving to 
charities are mixed. Using two-year pooled cross-sectional data, Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall 
(2003) investigate the intra-household decision-making over charitable giving.
37
 Comparing 
households in which the husband and the wife decide jointly on charitable giving with those in 
which couples relying on a sole decision-maker, Andreoni et al. (2003) show that household 
bargaining decreases the amount of charitable giving by 6% and the husband has higher 
decision-making authority. The result of decrease in giving therefore indicates gender-based 
difference in giving preferences within households. In contrast, Yoruk (2009) replicates the study 
of Andreoni et al. (2003) using a cross-sectional dataset from Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) and finds contrary results.
38
 His study presents evidence that bargaining increases the 
amount of charitable giving by 7% and the wife has relatively higher bargaining power than the 
husband. This result indicates couples having identical giving preference. In sum, the question of 
how married couples make charitable donations through household bargaining process is far 
from clear. 
There might be several possible reasons for the mixed results.  First, previous studies use 
either the pooled cross-sectional or cross-sectional data under the very restrictive assumption that 
                                                          
36
 Andreoni et al. (2003) suggest that when the couple’s preferences are identical, giving by the couple could be 
below the simple sum of giving amounts by both partners according to Samuelson efficiency conditions, and giving 
by the couple could possibly be above the simple sum of giving amounts by both partners because of the pushing-up 
“income effect”. 
37
 In their study, Andreoni et al. (2003) use U.S. household survey conducted independently in 1992 and 1994 by the 
Gallup Organization, and commissioned by Independent Sector. Pooling the two independent cross-sectional 
datasets gives them a sample of 4,180 households. Both the 1992 and 1994 survey include a question on who 
allocates money to charities in the household. 
38
 In conducting a cross-sectional study, Yoruk (2009) uses the 2003 wave of data extracted from the Center on 
Philanthropy Panel Study, the Philanthropy Module of the PSID. The 2003 wave of the survey data contains 
information on giving and volunteering for a sample of 7,822 U.S. households. Particularly, the 2003 survey 
includes information on who is the primary decision-maker in the household to decide charitable donations. 
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there are no unobserved individual effects. However, failure to adequately control for certain 
unobserved characteristics may cause biased estimators. For example, the husband or the wife 
with relatively higher persuading ability would be more likely to be a decision maker in a 
household. An individual’s persuading ability, however, cannot be observed.39 In this case, a 
study using a single cross section (e.g. Yoruk (2009)) or just a pooling of the cross sections (e.g. 
Andreoni et al. (2003)) will produce biased and inconsistent estimators. This study attempts to 
reduce, if not eliminate, such bias and inconsistency by using a longitudinal dataset. In addition, 
the quality of the survey data used in this study is superior to other frequently-used household 
surveys of giving. For instance, compared with the dataset used by Andreoni et al. (2003), the 
dataset from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study used in this study not only has a larger 
sample size but has no problem of missing data (Wilhelm, 2006).  
Second, this study provides new insights into the question of who is prevailing in the 
intra-household bargaining over charitable giving by investigating how the theory of traditional 
views on gender roles may influence jointly-deciding charitable giving. Traditional views on 
gender roles are generally the attitudes that men are providers and women are homemakers. 
According to such a theory, households that hold strict traditional views on gender roles are 
expected to be husband-deciding families. By contrary, households that have relatively less or no 
traditional views on gender roles are likely to be more egalitarian, in which case men and women 
are equal in all domains (Helmreich, Walster, and Gibson, 1982; Claffey and Mickelson, 2009) 
Therefore, couples belonging to a more conservative religious denomination have a higher 
incidence of having the husband decide on the household’s charitable giving (Wiepking and 
Bekkers, 2010). It is reasonable to hypothesize that husbands in the strict conservative religious 
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 One’s persuading ability is unlikely to change over two-year period, and thus one’s persuading ability will be 
controlled using the fixed effect approach. 
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households have higher decision-making authorities than the husbands in less (or no) 
conservative religious households. Correspondingly, the hypothesis in this study is that husbands 
in the strict Protestant households are expected to have higher decision-making power over 
charitable giving, compared with the husbands in the less-strict Protestant or non-Protestant 
households. 
To preview, the empirical findings of this study contrast with those of Yoruk (2009) but 
support the conclusion of Andreoni et al. (2003); Results show that bargaining over charitable 
giving reduces household giving and married households give to charity in favor of the 
husband’s preferences. The reduction of charitable giving when couples make joint decisions 
implies that household bargaining is costly.
40
 Donations that favorites one spouse creates 
negative externalities experienced by the other. Additionally, the evidence of this study shows 
the joint decision made by a family with traditional views on gender roles tends to have the 
husband with more bargaining power. 
The next two sections present the data and the identification strategy. The subsequent 
analysis has three parts. First, results show evidence of gender differences in giving between 
single males and single females, as well as married couples (husband-deciding couples, wife-
deciding couples, and jointly-deciding couples). Second, evidence is provided on whether 
household bargaining increases or decreases charitable giving, and which gender is prevailing in 
the bargaining process. Third, evidence on differences of bargaining power within households 
from the prospective of the theory of traditional gender roles is explored. 
 
                                                          
40
 When bargaining is costly, it indicates that tastes are not identical between the couple. According to Andreoni et 
al. (2003), the cost can be inframarginal. In this case, the couple might have conflicts in deciding whether or not to 
give to certain charities. The cost can also be marginal, for example, the cost can occur when deciding how much to 
give. Both types of costs potentially reduce the charitable giving by a household. 
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3.2 Data 
This study uses longitudinal surveys of U.S. households in 2003 and 2005 by the Center 
on Philanthropy Panel Study (COPPS hereafter), the Philanthropy Module of the PSID.
41
 Both 
the 2003 and 2005 waves of data contain extensive information on charitable giving in regards to 
different categories, such as demographics, health status, religious affiliation, and economic 
variables for both the head of the household and the spouse.
42
 Table A9 of the appendix 
describes the variables used in the empirical models.
43
 Particularly, a unique feature of the 
survey is that it includes crucial information on “Who Decides” to give to charities within a 
family. Questions asked regarding this issue are: “who in your family was involved in decisions 
about how much support to give individual charities;” and “when you and your spouse made 
decisions about supporting charities jointly, did one of you make most of the decision, did your 
mostly decided together, or did you each make your own separate decisions?”  
Since the dataset contains information on household level, and in order to investigate 
gender differences in charitable giving of singles and couples separately, the COPPS sample is 
parsed into singles and couples (i.e. married couples and couples living together). The singles 
includes 6,412 observations, 2,065 of whom are single males and 4,347 are single females. For 
single males 48.5% gave to charities during the interviewed years, and the average amount they 
                                                          
41
 The 2001, 2007, and 2009 waves were not chosen to merge to the panel because those waves do not include 
information about decision making authority. The 2011 and 2013 waves are not available yet.  
42
 As has often been noted, non-response can be a serious problem in survey data. However, missing data is scarce in 
the COPPS data. Wilhelm (2007) suggests that the quality of the giving data from COPPS is superior to other major 
frequently-used household surveys of giving, such as the five frequently-used household surveys of giving: Giving 
and Volunteering; The General Social Survey; Giving and Volunteering in California; Canada’s Survey of Giving; 
and The 1974 National Study of Philanthropy. For example, 35% of the Giving and Volunteering respondents have 
missing data in one or more of the questions about giving toward disaggregated purposes; in contrast, only 1% of the 
COPPS respondents have any missing giving data (Wilhelm 2006). Giving and Volunteering is widely used by 
many researches on giving, such as the study by Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall, 2003. 
43
 The survey does not report the marginal tax rate for each household. Following Andreoni et al. (2003); and Yoruk 
(2009), the tax price of giving is calculated as 1 for households with no itemization and (1-marginal tax rate) for 
households itemizing deductions. The marginal tax rate for each household is calculated using information on filing 
status (i.e. single, head of household, married filing jointly, married filing separately), federal tax schedules, income, 
number of dependents under age 18, and number of household members. 
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gave is $588 as shown in Table 8. In contrast, 50.8% single females were donors, and single 
females gave $596 on average. Generally, the average amount of donation from singles females 
was higher compared with the average amount that single males gave. In addition, relative to 
their incomes, single females also gave a larger share of their income to charities. Single males 
donated 1.8% of their income to charity, whereas single females gave 2.5% of their income to 
charity.  
Following Brown, Einolf, and Wilhelm (2013), the couples sample is further parsed into 
husband-deciding couples, wife-deciding couples, and jointly-deciding couples in order to 
investigate different charitable giving preferences of husbands and wives.
4445
 Husband-deciding 
couples (n=1,168) donated $2,143, which was 2.9% of their household income. Wife-deciding 
couples (n=1,793) donated $1,789, and it averaged 2.3% of their household income. Jointly-
deciding couples (n=2,833) donated $2,653, and was 5.2% of household income. The sample 
statistics are generally consistent with those presented in Yoruk (2009). The average donation by 
husband-deciding couples is much higher than the wife-deciding couples. Joint-deciding couples 
on average give more to charity compared with either the husband-deciding couple or the wife-
deciding couples. Additionally, joint-deciding couples give about 3 percentages more of their 
income to charities compared with husband-deciding couples and wife-deciding couples. 
 
                                                          
44
 The sole decision-maker has the advantage for that individual of yielding donations in favor of his/her giving 
preference, although his/her spouse’s time could be involved in deciding donations. Donations from jointly-deciding 
couples are yielded in a manner that is a microcosm of household bargaining outcome (Brown, 2000). 
45
 Given the survey questionnaire, after excluding married households that involve other charitable giving decision-
makers (i.e. father Jim, or son John), married couples can be categorized into four groups: husband-deciders (1,168), 
wife-deciders (1,793), joint-deciders (2,833), and separate-deciders (640). The household characteristics of these 
groups are consistent with the sample characteristics presented in Andreoni et al. (2003) and Yoruk (2009). In 
Andreoni et al. (2003), 19% of the couples are husband-deciders, 29% are wife-deciders, and 52% decide jointly.  In 
Yoruk (2009), 14% of the couples are husband-deciders, 26% are wife-deciders, 51% are joint-deciders, and 9% are 
separate-deciders. In this study, 18% of the couples are husband-deciders, 28% are wife-deciders, 44% are joint-
deciders, and 9.9% are separate-deciders. 
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Table 8. Donations by Marital Status and by Decision-Making Authority 
 
      
  All sample 
Single 
Males 
Single 
Females 
Husband-
deciding 
Wife-
deciding Jointly-deciding 
Donations in dollars 
      
Mean 1,189 588 596 2,143 1,789 2,653 
Standard deviation 3,169 2,306 1,671 4,354 4,073 4,461 
       
Donations as a percentage 
of household income 
      
Mean 2.50% 1.80% 2.53% 2.9% 2.3% 5.2% 
Standard deviation 0.25 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.54 
Observations 16,030 2,065 4,347 1,168 1,793 2,833 
 
 Notes: 1. Single sample is parsed into single males and single females. 
 2. 
Couples sample includes husband-deciding households, wife-deciding households, and jointly-deciding households. 
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3.3 Estimation Methodology 
3.3.1   Gender differences 
To see the existence of intra-household bargaining between the husband and the wife, this 
study looks for gender differences in the decision to give to charities.  By investigating the 
probability of giving by each group and the dollar amount of giving by each group, this study 
looks for gender differences in the decision to give between the single males and the single 
females as well as comparing the giving patterns among the husband-deciding couples, the wife-
deciding couples, and the jointly-deciding couples. 
The general specification for the panel probit model can be written as 
𝑔𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,    𝑡 = 1,2, 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁. 
   With  𝑔𝑖𝑡 = {
0      if 𝑔𝑖𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
1      if 𝑔𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0
 
where  𝑔𝑖𝑡
∗  is the unobserved variable that represents the latent probabilities or incidences that a 
household chooses to give to charity. Xit represents the observed characteristics that are relevant 
to the decision-making process, including education level and other standard socio-demographic 
variables such as family income, health status, age, employment status, and residency.
46
 𝛽 is the 
vector of parameters of interest. 𝑡 and 𝑖 represent the year and household units, respectively. The 
panel tobit model regression, in which the dependent variable is continuous measure of 
charitable giving is estimated following a similar procedure to that described for the panel probit 
model.  
 
 
 
                                                          
46
 Descriptions for these variables can be found in Table A9 in the Appendix. 
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3.3.2   Joint Decision-making: Influence of bargaining on charitable giving 
Following Anreoni, Brown, and Rischall (2003), this study estimates giving choices by 
jointly-deciding couples as a linear combination of the amount the husband would choose if he 
were the sole decision-maker, and the amount the wife would choose if she were the sole 
decision-maker on charitable giving.  
The level of charitable giving by the household can be expressed as 
𝐺 = 𝐼ℎ ∙ 𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑 + 𝐼𝑤 ∙ 𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 + 𝐼𝑗 ∙ 𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 .     (1) 
Where 𝐼ℎ and 𝐼𝑤 are indicator dummies equal to one if the husband or the wife is the decision-
maker, respectively. 𝐼𝑗  is an indicator dummy which is equal to one when the couple makes 
charitable giving decision jointly. Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
𝐺 = 𝐼ℎ ∙ 𝐴𝑋ℎ + 𝐼𝑤 ∙ 𝐵𝑋𝑤 + 𝐼𝑗 ∙ (𝜃ℎ𝐴𝑋ℎ + 𝜃𝑤𝐵𝑋𝑤) 
     =(𝐼ℎ + 𝐼𝑗𝜃ℎ)𝐴𝑋ℎ + (𝐼𝑤 + 𝐼𝑗𝜃𝑤)𝐵𝑋𝑤.   (2) 
Let 𝑋ℎ be the vector of controlled variables when the husband is the decision-maker and the 
vector A be the associated coefficients. Similarly, 𝑋𝑤 is the vector of variables being controlled 
in the estimation when the wife makes decision and B is denoted as the vector of coefficients 
from the estimation. The parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 are defined as the weights of how the couple’s 
giving decision is influenced by preferences of the husband and the wife separately. Therefore, 
the predicted household level of charitable giving will be 𝐺 = 𝐴𝑋ℎ  when the husband is the 
decision-maker; the predicted giving will be 𝐺 = 𝐵𝑋𝑤 when the wife has the decision-making 
authority, and household giving to charity will be 𝐺 = 𝜃ℎ𝐴𝑋ℎ + 𝜃𝑤𝐵𝑋𝑤 if the husband and the 
wife make charitable giving decisions together. 
More specifically, the amount of donations if the husband is the sole decision-maker can 
be estimated by 
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𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 𝐴𝑋ℎ + 𝜀ℎ = 𝛼1𝑥1ℎ + 𝛼2𝑥2ℎ +⋯+ 𝛼𝑘𝑥𝑘ℎ + 𝜀ℎ.  (3) 
The amount of donation if the wife is the sole decision-maker can be estimated by 
𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓𝑒 = 𝐵𝑋𝑤 + 𝜀𝑤 = 𝛽1𝑥1𝑤 + 𝛽2𝑥2𝑤 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑤 + 𝜀𝑤.   (4) 
If the husband and the wife make charitable giving decisions together, their giving behavior can 
be estimated by the following equation 
𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 = 𝛾1𝑥1ℎ + 𝛾2𝑥2ℎ +⋯+ 𝛾𝑘𝑥𝑘ℎ + 𝛿1𝑥1𝑤 + 𝛿2𝑥2𝑤 +⋯+ 𝛿𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑤 + 𝜀𝑗 
= Γ𝑋ℎ + Δ𝑋𝑤 + 𝜀𝑗 = 𝜃ℎ𝐴𝑋ℎ + 𝜃𝑤𝐵𝑋𝑤 + 𝜀𝑗  
Which is,  𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦̂ = 𝜃ℎ𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ + 𝜃𝑤𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂? + 𝜀𝑗.    (5) 
From equation (5), this study follows Andreoni et al. (2003) and Yoruk (2009) and 
estimats the amount of charitable giving by jointly-deciding couples as a linear combination of 
the levels of donations that would have been chosen by the giving preferences of husband and 
the wife if each were the sole decision-maker. In this case, the parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 are hence 
interpreted as the weights of how the couple’s giving decision being influenced by preferences of 
the husband and the wife separately. 
Therefore, the husband has greater bargaining power than the wife when 𝜃ℎ > 𝜃𝑤 , and 
the wife has relatively greater bargaining power when results show 𝜃ℎ < 𝜃𝑤 . In addition, as 
indicated by Andreoni et al. (2003), parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 are scalars and are not constrained by 
any conditions. Thus the sum of 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 can help us answer the question of whether intra-
household bargaining increases or decreases the level of household charitable giving. 
Specifically, if 
  𝜃ℎ + 𝜃𝑤 >1  Bargaining can increase household charitable giving 
  𝜃ℎ + 𝜃𝑤 <1  Bargaining can decrease household charitable giving 
  𝜃ℎ + 𝜃𝑤 =1  Bargaining has no impact on household charitable giving. 
   
49 
 
3.4 Results: Gender Differences and Influence of Household Bargaining 
3.4.1   Gender Differences 
3.4.1.1)   Single Males and Single Females 
The probabilities of giving to charities for single males and single females are examined 
in this section by using the panel probit model. The first two columns in Table 9 show the 
estimation of the probability of giving to charities by single males and single females, and the 
results shown in the last two columns are from tobit estimation on the level of donation by each 
sex.  
Marginal effects from the probit specification shown in Table 9 indicate that tax price of 
giving is not significantly different from zero for either group. Household income, however, has 
significant positive impacts on the likelihood of giving to charities for both single males and 
single females. Additionally, age, education, attending churches, and health status significantly 
and positively influence the probability of giving for both groups. Being Hispanic plays a 
negative role to decide whether to give or not for only single males. In contrast, religious 
affiliation and employment status have significant impacts on the probability of giving for only 
single females.  
Comparing single males and single females giving patterns, Table 10 shows that the 
hypothesis that the decision to give by single males and single females are the same can be 
rejected at the 10% level of significance (𝜒2(13) = 21.48, 𝑝 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = 0.06). It suggests that the 
probability of whether to give to charities can be significantly different between single males and 
single females.  
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Table 9. Probability of Giving and Total Contributions to Charity, by Singles 
 
  Probability of Giving (Probit)   Amount of Total Contributions (Tobit) 
  Single Males Single Females   Single Males Single Females 
Ln(price of giving) -0.5291(0.3579)  -0.0589(0.1309)  
 
-2.8517(1.4337)** -0.5332(0.5736)  
Ln(family income) 0.1086(0.0200)*** 0.1140(0.0141)*** 
 
0.4939(0.0801)*** 0.5882(0.0558)*** 
Age 0.0068(0.0009)*** 0.0085(0.0007)*** 
 
0.0308(0.0034)*** 0.0388(0.0023)*** 
High school grads 0.0433(0.0356)  0.0699(0.0225)*** 
 
0.2221(0.1469)  0.3274(0.0987)*** 
Attended college 0.1142(0.0369)*** 0.1776(0.0246)*** 
 
0.6212(0.1632)*** 0.8870(0.1163)*** 
College grads 0.2595(0.0367)*** 0.2893(0.0266)*** 
 
1.1897(0.1874)*** 1.5178(0.1555)*** 
Hispanic -0.1207(0.0625)* -0.0639(0.0436)  
 
-0.6349(0.2063)*** -0.2577(0.1736)  
Church goer 0.3194(0.0244)*** 0.2212(0.0192)*** 
 
1.5472(0.1109)*** 1.1265(0.0711)*** 
Health 0.1065(0.0355)*** 0.1112(0.0225)*** 
 
0.3699(0.1317)*** 0.4962(0.0859)*** 
Employed -0.0059(0.0350)  0.0801(0.0230)*** 
 
0.0448(0.1356)  0.3444(0.0922)*** 
Protestant -0.0140(0.0270)  -0.0364(0.0201)* 
 
-0.0321(0.1035)  -0.0771(0.0820)  
Urban 
 
Observations 
0.0253(0.0306)  
 
1,901 
0.0256(0.0211)  
 
3,993 
  
0.1809(0.1153)  
 
1,901 
0.1538(0.0844)* 
 
3,993 
Notes:
 1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
2. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
3. 
Total contributions are measured in the natural log form. 
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Table 10. Test of Structural Stability, by Singles 
 
     Hypothesis: charitable giving equations of the pairwise groups are the 
same. 
 
 
Probit 
 
 
single 
males single females single households 
 log-likelihood -1050.14 -2285.69 -3346.57 
 
     𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢𝑟(unrestricted) -3335.83 
   𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑟 (restricted) -3346.57 
   χ2 (chi-squares) 2*[-3335.83-(-3346.57)]=21.48 
      
 
Tobit 
 
 
single 
males single females single households 
 log-likelihood -3387.37 -7457.59 -10854.84 
 
     
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢𝑟(unrestricted) 
-
10844.96 
   
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑟 (restricted) 
-
10854.84 
   χ2 (chi-squares) 2*[-10844.96-(-1085484)]=19.76 
 
     Summarized Results of Coefficient Comparisons 
  
 
Probit Tobit 
 
singles (d.f.=13) singles (d.f.=13) 
 
single males and single females single males and single females 
chi-squares 21.48* 19.76* 
p-values 0.06 0.1 
 
Notes: 
1.
 Steps of calculating chi-squares to test the structure stability: 
1).
 Fit the same model in each subsample 
2).
 Calculated the unrestricted log likelihood is the sum of the subsample log likelihoods: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢𝑟= 
(𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)+ (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠) 
3).
 Pool the subsamples, and fit the model to the pooled sample 
4).
 Restricted log likelihood is that from the pooled sample: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑟  
5).
 χ2 = 2 ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢𝑟 -𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑟)  
     degrees of freedom = (K-1)*model size. 
2.
 *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
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Results shown in Table 9 revealed that the giving patterns of the levels of charitable 
giving for single males and single females are mainly consistent with the patterns of giving 
probability for both groups. Marginal effects indicate that household income, age, education, 
attending churches, and good health positively and significantly affect the dollar amount of 
giving by both single males and females. However, single males are significantly sensitive to the 
tax price of giving. For example, if the tax price increases 1%, single males will lower their 
donation by 2.9% on average. Moreover, single females are significantly influenced by 
employment status and residency, whole single males are not. In addition, Table 10 suggests that 
the level of charitable giving for single males and single females are different at 10% level of 
significance. 
3.4.1.2)   married couples 
Married couples mainly can differ on the decision to give and how much to give. From 
the probit specification in Table 11, results show that when the husband is the sole decision-
maker of charitable giving and when the wife is the sole decision-maker, a 1% increase in tax 
price will cause a 5.4% probability for wife-deciding couples and a 7.3% probability for jointly-
deciding couples to donate nothing, respectively. Moreover, the tax price has a statistically 
negative influence on the wife’s decision to give, however, the tax price has a negative but 
insignificant effect on husband’s decision to give. Instead of a unitary family behavior, the result 
hence suggests a bargaining existence between the husband and the wife. Comparing the giving 
patterns of husband-deciding couples and wife-deciding couples, Table 12 suggests that the 
probability of giving is different for husband-deciding couples and jointly-deciding couples at 10% 
level of significance. However, the probability of giving is not different for husband-deciding 
couples and wife-deciding couples from zero at conventional significance levels. 
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Table 11. Probability of Charitable Giving for Married Couples, by Who Decides 
                                 Probability of Giving (Probit) 
 
Husband-deciders Wife-deciders joint-deciders 
    Ln (tax price of giving) -0.0535 -0.0725** -0.0715* 
 
(0.042) (0.034) (0.040) 
  
  Ln (family income) 0.0020 0.0018 0.0023 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
  
  AgeH 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
  AgeW -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
  High school grad_H 0.0034 0.0052 0.0048 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
  
  High school grad_W -0.0202** -0.0181*** -0.0150** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
  
  Some college_H 0.0117** 0.0159*** 0.0186*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
  
  Some college_W -0.0228*** -0.0165** -0.0180** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
  
  College grad_H 0.0149** 0.0141*** 0.0136** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
  
  College grad_W -0.0239*** -0.0247*** -0.0225*** 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
  
  Hispanic_H -0.0067 -0.0078 -0.0097 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) 
  
  Hispanic_W 0.0022 -0.0013 0.0015 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
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  Church goer_H -0.0015 -0.0003 0.0005 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
  
  Church goer_W -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0021 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
  
  Health_H 0.0005 0.0011 0.0042 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
  
  Health_W -0.0034 -0.0049 -0.0043 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
  
  Working_H 0.0075 -0.0006 0.0009 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
  
  Working_W -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0001 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
  
  Protestant_H 0.0035 0.0015 0.0019 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
  
  Protestant_W -0.0019 -0.0058 -0.0042 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
  
  Urban -0.0076* -0.0042 -0.0043 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
  
  Observations 1168 1793 2833 
 
Notes:
 1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
2. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
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Table 12. Test of Structural Stability: the Probability of Charitable Giving, by Who Decides 
 
     
 
husband-deciders wife-deciders 
husband-
deciders and 
wife-deciders 
          log-
likelihood -71.23 -65.58 -136.99 
          unrestricted -136.81 
     restricted -136.99 
     chi-squres 2*[-136.81-(-108.65)]=0.36 
   
       
 
husband-deciders joint-deciders 
husband-
deciders and 
joint-deciders 
   log-
likelihood -71.23 -108.65 -195.35 
          unrestricted -179.88 
     restricted -195.35 
     chi-squres 2*[-179.88-(-195.35)]=30.94 
          
 
wife-deciders 
joint-
deciders 
wife-deciders and 
joint-deciders 
   log-
likelihood -65.58 -108.65 -183.14 
          unrestricted -174.23 
     restricted -183.14 
     chi-squres 2*[-174.23-(-183.14)]=17.82 
   
       Summarized Results of Coefficient Comparisons 
   
 
probability of charitable giving 
 
couples (d.f.=22) couples (d.f.=22) couples (d.f.=22) 
 
husband-deciders and wife-
deciders 
husband-deciders 
and joint-deciders 
wife-deciders and 
joint-deciders 
chi-squares 0.36 30.94* 17.82 
p-values 1 0.097 0.72 
Notes: 
1.
 Steps of calculating chi-squares to test the structure stability with hypothesis that charitable giving 
equations of the parewise goups are the same: 
1).
 Fit the same model in each subsample 
2).
 Calculated the unrestricted log likelihood is the sum of the subsample log likelihoods: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢𝑟 
3).
 Pool the subsamples, and fit the model to the pooled sample 
4).
 Restricted log likelihood is that from the pooled sample: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑟  
5).
 χ2 = 2 ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢𝑟 -𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑟)  
     degrees of freedom = (K-1)*model size. 
2.
 *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level.  
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Table 13. Amount of Charitable Giving for Married Couples, by Who Decides 
                                  Total Contributions (Tobit) 
 
Husband-deciders Wife-deciders joint-deciders 
    Ln (tax price of giving) -0.3137 -1.3281** -0.9396 
 
(0.646) (0.590) (0.698) 
  
  Ln (family income) 0.5449*** 0.5027*** 0.5210*** 
 
(0.049) (0.043) (0.051) 
  
  AgeH 0.0182*** 0.0112** 0.0184*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
  
  AgeW 0.007 0.0140*** 0.0067 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
  
  High school grad_H -0.0942 -0.0021 -0.0897 
 
(0.077) (0.066) (0.081) 
  
  High school grad_W -0.0271 -0.0206 -0.0182 
 
(0.075) (0.069) (0.080) 
  
  Some college_H 0.1939** 0.2785*** 0.2468*** 
 
(0.080) (0.070) (0.085) 
  
  Some college_W 0.1500* 0.1645** 0.1551* 
 
(0.078) (0.071) (0.083) 
  
  College grad_H 0.2763*** 0.3967*** 0.2646*** 
 
(0.080) (0.070) (0.083) 
  
  College grad_W 0.3733*** 0.2747*** 0.3348*** 
 
(0.080) (0.074) (0.085) 
  
  Hispanic_H -0.3398** -0.3269*** -0.3337** 
 
(0.135) (0.117) (0.143) 
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Hispanic_W -0.1914 -0.1638 -0.194 
 
(0.135) (0.119) (0.144) 
  
  Church goer_H 0.6983*** 0.6603*** 0.7258*** 
 
(0.072) (0.058) (0.077) 
  
  Church goer_W 0.3739*** 0.4401*** 0.3656*** 
 
(0.076) (0.062) (0.081) 
  
  Health_H 0.0581 0.0314 0.0724 
 
(0.081) (0.070) (0.085) 
  
  Health_W 0.1139 0.0483 0.0788 
 
(0.075) (0.068) (0.080) 
  
  Working_H 0.1806** 0.0957 0.1252* 
 
(0.071) (0.063) (0.074) 
  
  Working_W -0.0278 -0.0112 -0.0209 
 
(0.051) (0.047) (0.054) 
  
  Protestant_H 0.3500*** 0.2687*** 0.3665*** 
 
(0.057) (0.050) (0.059) 
  
  Protestant_W 0.2007*** 0.1524*** 0.1596*** 
 
(0.057) (0.051) (0.060) 
  
  Urban 0.1572*** 0.1481*** 0.1893*** 
 
(0.052) 
(0.047) (0.054) 
  Observations 1,168 1,793 2,833 
 
Notes:
 1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
2. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
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Table 14. Test of Structural Stability: the Amount of Charitable Giving, by Who Decides 
 
     
 
husband-deciders wife-deciders 
husband-
deciders and 
wife-deciders 
          log-
likelihood -1708.66 -2721.27 -4476.17 
          unrestricted -4429.93 
     restricted -4476.17 
     chi-squres 2*[-4429.93-(-4476.17)]=92.48 
  
       
 
husband-deciders joint-deciders 
husband-
deciders and 
joint-deciders 
   log-
likelihood -1708.66 -4307.7 -6052 
          unrestricted -6016.36 
     restricted -6052 
     chi-squres 2*[-1708.66-(-6052)]=71.28 
         
 
wife-deciders 
joint-
deciders 
wife-deciders and 
joint-deciders 
   log-
likelihood -2721.27 -4307.7 -7064.74 
          unrestricted -7028.97 
     restricted -7064.74 
     chi-squres 2*[-7028.97-(-7064.74)]=71.54 
  
       Summarized Results of Coefficient Comparisons 
   
 
Amount of charitable giving 
 
couples (d.f.=22) couples (d.f.=22) couples (d.f.=22) 
 
husband-deciders and wife-
deciders 
husband-deciders 
and joint-deciders 
wife-deciders and 
joint-deciders 
chi-squares 92.48*** 71.28*** 71.54*** 
p-values 0 0 0 
Notes: 
1.
 Steps of calculating chi-squares to test the structure stability, with hypothesis that charitable giving 
equations of the parewise goups are the same: 
1).
 Fit the same model in each subsample 
2).
 Calculated the unrestricted log likelihood is the sum of the subsample log likelihoods: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢𝑟 
3).
 Pool the subsamples, and fit the model to the pooled sample 
4).
 Restricted log likelihood is that from the pooled sample: 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑟  
5).
 χ2 = 2 ∗ (𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑢𝑟 -𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐿𝑟)  
     degrees of freedom = (K-1)*model size. 
2.
 *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, and * at 10% level. 
   
59 
 
From the tobit model results, Table 13 shows that household income, age, education, race, 
religious preference, residency, and attending church services positively and significantly affect 
the dollar amount of giving for all groups. However, only households with wives as sole 
decision-makers are significantly sensitive to the tax price of giving. For example, if the tax price 
increases 1%, wife-deciding couples will reduce their donation by 1.3%. Moreover, age of wife 
is positive and significant for the wife-deciding couples; employment status of husband is 
significant for husband-deciding and jointly-deciding groups. In addition, Table 14 suggests that 
the level of charitable giving for all possible pairs of groups is different from zero at 1% level of 
significance. All results strongly imply the existence of bargaining over charitable giving within 
households, and thus this study investigates the how bargaining influences the household 
charitable giving next. 
 
3.4.2   Joint Decision-making: Influence of bargaining on charitable giving 
When couples make charitable giving decisions jointly, their giving preferences is crucial 
in determining whether the bargaining increases or reduces charitable giving.  When couples 
have the same giving preference, the amount of time and effort to reach giving decisions to 
charities will be little. In this case, the charitable giving of one partner can create the “positive 
externalities” experienced by the other partner, and which is likely to increase the amount of 
giving by the joint-deciding household. However, when couples have the opposing preferences 
on charitable giving, more time and effort will be required to reach charitable giving decisions. 
The opposing tastes in giving thus create “negative externalities” which is likely to reduce the 
amounts of charitable giving by the household (Andreoni et al. 2003, Wiepking and Bekkers, 
2010). 
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Following Andreoni et al. (2003), this study estimates giving choices by jointly-deciding 
couples as a linear combination of the amount the husband would choose if he were sole 
decision-maker, and the amount the wife would choose, were she in charge.
47
 Results from Table 
15 show estimate for 𝜃ℎ is 0.561, and for 𝜃𝑤 is 0.359, both with standard error 0.004. In this case, 
𝜃ℎ + 𝜃𝑤 = 0.92 < 1, which implies that bargaining within marriage reduces charitable giving by 
8 percent.
48
 It suggests that household bargaining creates costly decision-making, and has 
decreasing returns to the charitable giving amount by the couples.  
The result that bargaining reduces giving is consistent with findings by Andreoni et al. 
(2003) but not with findings by Yoruk (2009). Sizes of 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 show that 𝜃ℎ > 𝜃𝑤, indicating 
the husband has significantly greater bargaining power than the wife when they jointly make 
decisions to give to charities.
49
 
This finding suggests the fundraisers to strive to understand the dynamics of the 
household. While engaging one partner, fundraisers are encouraged to consider both the spouses 
and learn the preferences of the couple. When meeting with donors, fundraisers and charitable 
organizations should strive to listen and learn the information of the decision-making authority in 
charitable giving. Meanwhile, charitable organizations should internally track who signs the 
contribution checks and keep records of interactions with both the husband and the wife if 
applicable. 
 
 
                                                          
47
 The explanatory variables in the models are price of giving, family income, religiosity, employment status, gender, 
age, race, residency, education, marital status, and health status. 
48
 Although the LHS of equation (5) is censored, I follow other studies and estimate equation (5) via OLS.  Tobit 
estimates of equation (5), which are available upon request, are almost identical to the OLS results. 
49
 In Andreoni’s study, the weight of the husband’s giving preference is 0.677 and the wife’s giving preference is 
0.260. In Yoruk’s study, the weight of the husband’s giving preference is 0.499 and the wife’s giving preference is 
0.567.The finding in this study is in line with Andreoni’s that the husband dominates the marital bargain over 
charitable giving. 
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Table 15. Estimates of Parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 for All Respondents 
 
 
All-respondents sample 
 
  
 Estimated prediction of joint-
deciding donations 
(𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦)̂  
  
Estimated prediction  
of husband-deciding donations 
 (𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ ) 
 
 
0.561*** 
(0.00395) 
 
Estimated prediction  
of wife-deciding donations 
 (𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?) 
 
 
0.359*** 
(0.00382) 
 
Constant -0.0459*** 
 (0.00167) 
  
Observations 16,030 
R-squared 0.836 
 
Notes: 
1.
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.
 𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂  and 𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?  are the amount of predicted giving that would have been donated by the husband if he had sole 
control over giving, respectively. 𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦̂  denotes the predicted amount of giving by the joint-deciders. 
 
3.
 Parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 are estimated from: 
 𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦̂ = 𝜃ℎ𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ +𝜃𝑤𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂? + 𝜀𝑗 
    = 0.561 ∗ 𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ +0.359 ∗ 𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?  
 
4.
 For the Tobit model of each regression, the dependent variable is measured in the natural log form of dollars. The 
explanatory variables are price of giving, age, Hispanic, residency, health status, education, employment status, 
church goers, and family income. The full results for all models are presented in TableA10 in the Appendix.  
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3.4.3   Traditional Gender Roles 
Traditional views on gender roles can present impacts on households’ financial 
management.  For households with heavier traditional views on gender roles, husbands normally 
have greater bargaining power over most decisions (Kenney 2006, Wiepking and Bekkers, 2010). 
According to the literature, religious affiliation is frequently used as a strong determinant of 
traditional values on gender roles. Especially, households with strict Protestant denominations 
are found to be relatively more likely to have traditional views of gender roles (Wiepking and 
Bekkers 2010). The couples with more traditional views on gender roles are expect to have less 
bargaining and the household charitable giving decision-making is largely in favor of the 
husbands’ giving preference. The couples with less or non-traditional views on gender roles are 
likely to create relatively more weight of the wives’ preference when the couples make decisions 
jointly. 
Based on the information of husbands and wives’ religious denominations, the all-
respondents sample is parsed into Protestant group and non-protestant group. Giving choices by 
jointly-deciding Protestant couples are estimated as a linear combination of the amount the 
husband would choose, were he in charge, and the amount the wife would choose, were she in 
charge. Results from Table 16 show that 𝜃ℎ =0.591 (0.0039), and 𝜃𝑤 =0.318 (0.0037). For 
Protestant households, the result (𝜃ℎ > 𝜃𝑤) indicates wives have significantly lower bargaining 
power than the husband when they make charitable decisions together. Since 𝜃ℎ + 𝜃𝑤 =
0.909 < 1, it then implies that bargaining among Protestant jointly-deciding couples reduces 
charitable giving by 9.1 percent on average, and this result is in line with findings of the all-
respondents sample.  
 
   
63 
 
Table 16. Estimates of Parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 for Protestants 
 
Protestants households 
 
  
 Estimated prediction of joint-
deciding donations 
(𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦)̂  
  
Estimated prediction  
of husband-deciding donations 
 (𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ ) 
 
 
0.591*** 
(0.00392) 
 
Estimated prediction  
of wife-deciding donations 
 (𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?) 
 
 
0.318*** 
(0.00372) 
 
Constant -0.0163*** 
 (0.00101) 
  
Observations 16,030 
R-squared 0.877 
 
Notes: 
1.
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.
 𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂  and 𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?  are the amount of predicted giving that would have been donated by the husband if he had sole 
control over giving, respectively. 𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦̂  denotes the predicted amount of giving by the joint-deciders. 
 
3.
 Parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 are estimated from: 
 𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦̂ = 𝜃ℎ𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ +𝜃𝑤𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂? + 𝜀𝑗 
    = 0.591 ∗ 𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ +0.318 ∗ 𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?  
 
4.
 For the Tobit model of each regression, the dependent variable is measured in the natural log form of dollars. The 
explanatory variables are price of giving, age, Hispanic, residency, health status, education, employment status, 
church goers, and family income. The full results for all models are presented in TableA11 in the Appendix. 
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Table 17. Estimates of Parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 for Non-protestants 
 
 
Non-protestants households 
 
  
 Estimated prediction of joint-
deciding donations 
(𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦)̂  
  
Estimated prediction  
of husband-deciding donations 
 (𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ ) 
 
 
0.511*** 
(0.00397) 
 
Estimated prediction  
of wife-deciding donations 
 (𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?) 
 
 
0.355*** 
(0.00380) 
 
Constant -0.0196*** 
 (0.00110) 
  
Observations 16,030 
R-squared 0.828 
 
1.
 Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2.
 𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂  and 𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?  are the amount of predicted giving that would have been donated by the husband if he had sole 
control over giving, respectively. 𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦̂  denotes the predicted amount of giving by the joint-deciders. 
 
3.
 Parameters 𝜃ℎ and 𝜃𝑤 are estimated from: 
 𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦̂ = 𝜃ℎ𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ +𝜃𝑤𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂? + 𝜀𝑗 
    = 0.511 ∗ 𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ +0.355 ∗ 𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂?  
 
4.
 For the Tobit model of each regression, the dependent variable is measured in the natural log form of dollars. The 
explanatory variables are price of giving, age, Hispanic, residency, health status, education, employment status, 
church goers, and family income. The full results for all models are presented in TableA12 in the Appendix. 
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Non-protestant households, in contrast, showing values of 𝜃ℎ  and 𝜃𝑤  have similar 
patterns (𝜃ℎ > 𝜃𝑤). Table 17 presents that 𝜃ℎ=0.511 (0.004), and 𝜃𝑤=0.355 (0.0038), which 
suggests that for non-protestant households, wives have much greater bargaining power over 
charitable giving than husbands.  𝜃ℎ + 𝜃𝑤 = 0.866 < 1  suggests a 13.4 percent decrease in 
charitable giving with the occurrence of bargaining within households.  Thus, for couples who 
are categorized to Protestant denominations, the wives indeed have a much lower authority to 
decide on the household’s charitable giving; and for couples who belong to less or non-protestant 
denominations, the husbands have 8 percentage points decline in their decision-making authority 
over charitable giving. The results here revealed that traditional gender roles influence household 
bargaining over charitable contribution. 
 
 
3.5 Discussion and Policy Implications 
This study investigates who has relatively more bargaining power when the husband and 
the wife make joint decisions on donations, whether the intra-household bargaining over 
charitable giving essentially increase or reduce the amount of charitable contributions, and 
whether traditional views on gender roles matter. These questions are far from clear based on 
existing studies.  
Using a longitudinal dataset, this study finds that the husband has significantly greater 
bargaining power than the wife when they jointly make decisions to give to charities, and the 
joint-decisions on charitable giving include 56% of the husband’s preference and 36% of the 
wife’s preference. Instead of being beneficial to the amount of household giving to charities, the 
household bargaining is costly. The costly household bargaining generally reduces the household 
donation by 8%. These finding are in line with the results of Andreoni et al. (2003) who use the 
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pooled cross-sectional data, but contrast with the findings of Yoruk (2009) who uses a cross-
sectional data. The panel data used in this study possess major advantages over conventional 
cross-sectional data set, and additionally the COPPS panel data not only has a larger sample size 
but has no problem of missing data. 
This study also supports the theory of traditional views on gender roles. For strict 
Protestant couples, the wives indeed have a much lower authority to decide on the household’s 
charitable giving. However for couples who have less or non-protestant denominations, the 
husbands present a much lower authority but still dominate the decision-making on charitable 
giving. The bargaining in households with less traditional views on gender roles creates more 
“negative externalities” which yields a 13% decrease in the amounts donated. 
This finding thus suggests the fundraisers to strive to understand the dynamics of the 
household. While engaging one partner, fundraisers are encouraged to consider and learn the 
preferences of the couple. In addition, this finding suggests the policy makers to avoid using 
generalizations when they consider their donors. Fundraising plan with the charitable 
organization is not a one-size-fits-all strategy, and efficient fundraising plans require more 
varieties and flexibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
67 
 
CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Why people give their hard-earned money away has been attracting considerable 
attention of researchers. American donors were more generous than ever in 2014, giving an 
estimated $358.4 billion to charity. People’s altruistic behaviors can be influenced by many 
factors. Income, education, and employment status are positively associated with individuals’ 
charitable giving decisions. However, evidence in the literature on the causal relationship 
between the degree of religiosity and charitable giving is still mixed. Additionally, little is known 
about the interaction effects between religiosity and gender on charitable giving. 
The first essay is interested in two questions. In particular, whether people who engage in 
religious activities are more generous in terms of both religious and secular giving, and whether 
gender differences exist in charitable giving within different levels of religiosity.  
The first essay has two main results. First, people who have higher religiosity have a 
greater propensity to give as well as higher levels of charitable giving to not only religious 
organizations, but also secular organizations. However, the propensity and amount of giving in 
that group are much lower for secular giving. These findings are consistent with many previous 
studies; however, the bivariate probit and bivariate tobit estimations provide unbiased and 
efficient estimates. The bivariate systems permit a test of correlation across the decisions of 
different giving, and this study finds that the correlation between religious giving and secular 
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giving is strongly significant. By controlling such a correlation, the impacts of religiosity on 
religious and secular giving are not as significant as we would have thought, taking into account 
the correlations between different types of giving.   
Second, although giving differences between men and women are not immediately 
evident, taking religiosity into account, differences in men’s and women’s propensities to give to 
philanthropy are found. Based on the finding that highly religious men and women are generous 
donors, results show that gender difference only exists between highly religious men and women 
for small donations. Highly religious men are 1.8 percent more likely to make small donations 
than highly religious women. Nonetheless, highly religious men and women do not have any 
difference in giving among medium and large donation amounts. In contrast, gender differences 
exist between men and women with low religiosity for all levels of giving. Women with low 
religiosity show greater propensity (6 percent) to make small donations than their counterparts; 
however, men with low religiosity are more likely to make medium and large donations than 
women with low religiosity.  
Since there are opposite gender-based differences for religious and less-religious 
individuals, charitable organizations can consider tailoring different fundraising plans. For 
instance, charitable organizations could specifically solicit donations from highly religious men 
and less-religious women in order to turn these non-donors into donors. Hence, charitable 
organizations should make different soliciting plans. 
Husband and wife make decisions through bargaining and negotiation. However, major 
literature has treated the charitable decisions from husband and wife indifferently. Little is 
known about spousal bargaining over decisions to give to charities within families. Most 
research on charitable giving assumes that decisions on charitable giving are a household’s 
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decision rather than an individual’s decision. Rare studies exist on the intra-household 
bargaining over giving to charities, and the results of existing studies are mixed.  
The second essay offers new evidence of spousal bargaining over charitable donations 
within a household, using a longitudinal dataset. Previous studies use either pooled cross-
sectional or cross-sectional data, under the very restrictive assumption that there are no 
unobserved individual effects. However, failure to adequately control for certain unobserved 
characteristics may cause unreliable estimators. This study therefore reduces such bias and 
inconsistency by estimating panel models. Additionally, the quality of the survey data used in 
this study is superior to other frequently-used household surveys of giving (Wilhelm, 2006). 
Second, the second essay provides new insights into the question of “who is prevailing in 
the intra-household bargaining over charitable giving” by investigating traditional views on 
gender roles. Empirical results of the second essay support the theory of traditional views on 
gender roles. Results show that for strict Protestant couples, the wives indeed have a much lower 
authority to decide on the household’s charitable giving. However for couples who have less or 
non-protestant denominations, the husbands present a much lower authority but still dominate 
the decision-making on charitable giving. The bargaining in households with less traditional 
views on gender roles creates more “negative externalities” which yields a decrease in the 
amounts donated. 
This finding thus suggests the fundraisers to strive to understand the dynamics of the 
household. While engaging one partner, fundraisers are encouraged to consider and learn the 
preferences of the couple. In addition, this finding suggests the policy makers to avoid using 
generalizations when they consider their donors. Fundraising plan with the charitable 
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organization is not a one-size-fits-all strategy, and efficient fundraising plans require more 
varieties and flexibilities. 
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Table A1  
Statistics Description, Religiosity and Gender Difference 
   
Name Description Mean Std. Dev. 
Give Whether choose to give 0.8544 0.3528 
Totgive Total household giving 2642.59 8207.84 
Gender Male=1 0.4300 0.4951 
Born usa Born in the USA=1 0.9236 0.2656 
Race black=1 0.0960 0.2946 
Ownrent Own or rent primary residence (own=1) 0.7016 0.4576 
Religiosity 
Active in a religious involvements  
(attending religious services every week or 
nearly every week=1) 
0.4262 0.4985 
Income Total annual income 56223.30 46694.15 
Confidence char 
High or some confidence in charitable 
organizations=1 
0.9027 0.2963 
Have more give 
more 
Have more, give more 0.7256 0.4463 
Edu colgrd College grad=1 0.3205 0.4667 
Age10 Continuous value for age, divided by 10 48.3149 16.2806 
Childyes Have children under 18 in household=1 0.3676 0.4822 
Size 
 
 
Marital status 
Total number of people in the household 
 
Married or living with significant 
others=1; 
while singles, widowed, divorced, and 
separated=0 
1.7920 
 
0.5443 
 
0.6851 
 
0.4981 
 
Inadequacy Worry about not having enough $=1 0.5789 0.4938 
Trust 1 if most people can be trusted 0.3590 0.4798 
    
 
1.
 Individuals characteristics, such as gender, race, and age, are the characteristics of survey respondents.
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Table A2  
Probit Specification, Religious Giving 
 
Dependent Variable of BVP Model: Propensity of Giving 
 
Religious Giving 
 
Single Probit Bivariate Probit 
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient 
Marginal Effect 
 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total Effect 
Religiosity 
(1 if high) 
0.7180***         
(0.0434)              
0.2658*** 
(0.0156)         
0.7182*** 
(0.0435)         
0.2651*** 
(0.0160)         
-0.0120*** 
(0.0023)         
0.2531***         
(0.0159)              
Gender (1 
if male) 
-0.0058       
(0.0442) 
-0.0022 
(0.0165) 
-0.0057 
(0.0440) 
-0.0021 
(0.0163) 
0.0058*** 
(0.0020)         
0.0036        
(0.0161) 
Age 
0.0174***        
(0.0017)               
0.0065*** 
(0.0006)         
0.0173*** 
(0.0017)         
0.0064*** 
(0.0006)         
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001)         
0.0062***        
(0.0006)              
Born in the 
USA 
0.1817**         
(0.0794)                 
0.0695** 
(0.0309)         
0.1834** 
(0.0793)         
0.0677** 
(0.0293)         
-0.0028 
(0.0033) 
0.0649**        
(0.0294)                
Race (1 if 
Black) 
-0.0360         
(0.0726) 
-0.0135 
(0.0274) 
-0.0342 
(0.0706) 
-0.0126 
(0.0261) 
0.0041 
(0.0029) 
-0.0086       
(0.0260) 
Employed 
0.1107**        
(0.0526)                
0.0415** 
(0.0199)         
0.1080** 
(0.0529)         
0.0399 ** 
(0.0195)         
-0.0097*** 
(0.0025)         
0.0301        
(0.0194) 
Married 
0.2105*** 
(0.0531)         
0.0790*** 
(0.0200)         
0.2091*** 
(0.0528)         
0.0772*** 
(0.0195)         
-0.0055** 
(0.0023)         
0.0717***        
(0.0194)              
Children 
under 18 in 
HH 
0.1893*** 
(0.0511)         
0.0699*** 
(0.0186)         
0.1877*** 
(0.0510)         
0.0693*** 
(0.0188)         
-0.0003 
(0.0022) 
0.0690***        
(0.0185)              
College_ 
grad 
0.1724*** 
(0.0504)         
0.0635*** 
(0.0183)         
0.1743*** 
(0.0512)         
0.0644*** 
(0.0189)         
-0.0073*** 
(0.0026)         
0.0570***        
(0.0187)              
Income 
0.0134** 
(0.0054)         
0.0050** 
(0.0020)         
0.0131*** 
(0.0047)         
0.0048*** 
(0.0017)         
-0.0038*** 
(0.0005)         
0.0010        
(0.0018) 
Family size 
0.0869** 
(0.0367)         
0.0324** 
(0.0137)         
0.0890** 
(0.0363)         
0.0329** 
(0.0134)         
0.0010 
(0.0014) 
0.0339**        
(0.0135)                
_cons 
-1.5804*** 
(0.1483)         
0.0000*** 
(0.0000)         
-1.5782*** 
(0.1471)         
0.0000*** 
(0.0000)         
0.0000*** 
(0.0000)         
0.0000***        
(0.0000)              
 
1.
 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively.  
2.
 The explanatory variables in the BVP models are gender, age, race, residency, marital status, education, and 
family size.  
3.
 Marginal effects from the BVP model, including direct effects and indirect effects are provided by LimDep.  
4.
 Direct Effect is the derivatives of 𝐸[𝑦1|𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑦2 = 1] with respect to 𝑋1; 
Indirect Effect is the derivatives of 𝐸[𝑦1|𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑦2 = 1] with respect to 𝑋2. 
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Table A3  
Probit Specification, Secular Giving 
Dependent Variable of BVP Model: Propensity of Giving 
 
Secular Giving 
 
Single Probit Bivariate Probit 
 
Coefficient 
Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient 
Marginal Effect 
 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Religiosity  
(1 if high) 
0.3642*** 
(0.0551)         
0.0632*** 
(0.0098)         
0.3623*** 
(0.0556)         
0.0475*** 
(0.0075)         
-0.0170*** 
(0.0020)         
0.0304*** 
(0.0077)         
Gender (1 
if male) 
-0.1761*** 
(0.0562)         
-0.0303*** 
(0.0098)         
-0.1737*** 
(0.0573)         
-0.0228*** 
(0.0074)         
0.0001  
(0.0010) 
-0.0226*** 
(0.0073)         
Age 
0.0072*** 
(0.0020)         
0.0012*** 
(0.0003)         
0.0076*** 
(0.0019)         
0.0010*** 
(0.0003)         
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001)         
0.0006** 
(0.0003)         
Born in the 
USA 
0.0865 
(0.0963) 
0.0154 
(0.0179) 
0.0837 
(0.0992) 
0.0110 
(0.0131) 
-0.0044** 
(0.0019)          
0.0066 
(0.0132) 
Race (1 if 
Black) 
-0.1275 
(0.0858) 
-0.0231 
(0.0166) 
-0.1225 
(0.0856) 
-0.0160 
(0.0113) 
0.0008  
(0.0017) 
-0.0152 
(0.0112) 
Employed 
0.2952*** 
(0.0655)         
0.0532*** 
(0.0126)         
0.2939*** 
(0.0684)         
0.0385*** 
(0.0092)         
-0.0026** 
(0.0013)          
0.0359*** 
(0.0092)         
Married  
0.1651** 
(0.0664)         
0.0285** 
(0.0118)         
0.1661** 
(0.0662)         
0.0218** 
(0.0087)         
-0.0050*** 
(0.0013)         
0.0168* 
(0.0087)          
Children 
under 18 in 
HH 
-0.0084 
(0.0661) 
-0.0014 
(0.0112) 
0.0078 
(0.0666) 
0.0010 
(0.0087) 
-0.0045*** 
(0.0013)         
-0.0034 
(0.0086) 
College_ 
grad 
0.2105*** 
(0.0705)         
0.0340*** 
(0.0109)         
0.2214*** 
(0.0725)         
0.0290*** 
(0.0096)         
-0.0041*** 
(0.0013)         
0.0249*** 
(0.0095)         
Income 
0.1224*** 
(0.0119)         
0.0207*** 
(0.0018)         
0.1149*** 
(0.0114)         
0.0150*** 
(0.0015)         
-0.0003*** 
(0.0001)         
0.0147*** 
(0.0015)         
Family size 
-0.0383 
(0.0441) 
-0.0065 
(0.0075) 
-0.0304 
(0.0428) 
-0.0040 
(0.0056) 
-0.0021** 
(0.0009)          
-0.0061 
(0.0057) 
_cons 
-0.2059 
(0.1767) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000)         
-0.2112 
(0.1730) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000)         
0.0000***  
(0.0000)         
0.0000*** 
(0.0000)         
 
1.
 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively.  
2.
 The explanatory variables in the BVP models are gender, age, race, residency, marital status, education, and 
family size.  
3.
 Marginal effects from the BVP model, including direct effects and indirect effects are provided by LimDep.  
4.
 Direct Effect is the derivatives of 𝐸[𝑦1|𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑦2 = 1] with respect to 𝑋1; 
Indirect Effect is the derivatives of 𝐸[𝑦1|𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑦2 = 1] with respect to 𝑋2.  
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Table A4  
Tobit Specification, Religious Giving 
 
Dependent Variable of BVT Model: Actual Amount of Giving 
Religious Giving 
 
Single Tobit Bivariate Tobit 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal effect 
 
Religiosity                   
(1 if high)                 
1.4791***                  
(0.0952)                 
0.7170***                  
(0.0453)                 
1.3522***                  
(0.1032)                 
1.0288***                  
(0.0979)                 
Gender (1 if 
male)                 
0.1269                  
(0.0943)                  
0.0626                  
(0.0467)                  
0.1428                  
(0.0972)                  
0.0722                  
(0.0516)                  
Age 
0.0310***                  
(0.0036)                 
0.0152***                  
(0.0018)                 
0.0251***                  
(0.0036)                 
0.0238***                  
(0.0050)                 
Born in the USA 
0.4202**                  
(0.1781)                 
0.1949**                  
(0.0776)                 
0.3568*                  
(0.2123)                   
0.2127                  
(0.1316)                  
Race (1 if Black)                 
0.1620                  
(0.1559)                  
0.0814                  
(0.0800)                  
0.1798                  
(0.1534)                  
0.0906                  
(0.0809)                  
Employed 
0.2146*                  
(0.1127)                   
0.1044*                  
(0.0542)                   
0.2333**                  
(0.1136)                 
0.1268*                  
(0.0689)                   
Married 
0.5442***                  
(0.1152)                 
0.2639***                  
(0.0550)                 
0.4272***                 
(0.1252)                 
0.2526***                  
(0.0789)                 
Children under 
18 in HH 
0.2722**                  
(0.1094)                 
0.1355**                  
(0.0550)                 
0.3397***                  
(0.1139)                 
0.1856***                  
(0.0651)                 
College_grad 
0.4430***                  
(0.1037)                 
0.2238***                  
(0.0537)                 
0.3923***                  
(0.1045)                 
0.2117***                  
(0.0614)                 
Income 
0.1290***                  
(0.0105)                 
0.0635***                  
(0.0052)                 
0.1265***                  
(0.0065)                 
0.0957***                  
(0.0107)                 
Family size 
0.1290                  
(0.0805)                  
0.0635                  
(0.0396)                  
0.1141                  
(0.0890)                  
0.0631                  
(0.0518)                  
 
1.
 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively.  
2.
 For Bivariate Tobit model, the dependent variable is measured in thousands of dollars. The explanatory variables 
in the BVT models are gender, age, race, residency, marital status, education, and family size.  
3.
 Marginal effects from the BVT model are calculated using Delta Method. 
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Table A5  
Tobit Specification, Secular Giving 
 
Dependent Variable of BVT Model: Actual Amount of Giving 
Secular Giving 
 
Single Tobit Bivariate Tobit 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal effect 
 
Religiosity                   
(1 if high)                 
0.9881***                  
(0.2957)                 
0.5360***                  
(0.1599)                 
0.6969*                  
(0.4050)                   
0.4458**                  
(0.2247)                 
Gender  (1 if 
male)                 
-0.2003                  
(0.2985)                  
-0.1088                  
(0.1620)                  
-0.0903                  
(0.3874)                  
-0.0460                  
(0.1389)                  
Age 
0.0586***                  
(0.0113)                 
0.0319***                  
(0.0062)                 
0.0279*                  
(0.0155)                   
0.0287*                  
(0.0165)                   
Born in the USA 
-0.4700                  
(0.5495)                  
-0.2602                  
(0.3094)                  
-0.3846                  
(0.8427)                  
-0.1479                  
(0.1315)                  
Race  (1 if 
Black)                 
-0.4608                  
(0.5003)                  
-0.2466                  
(0.2633)                  
-0.4636                  
(0.9368)                  
-0.2163                  
(0.2329)                  
Employed 
0.1352                  
(0.3557)                  
0.0734                  
(0.1927)                  
0.2150                  
(0.4511)                  
0.1123                  
(0.2088)                  
Married 
0.5423                  
(0.3633)                  
0.2939                  
(0.1960)                  
0.2899                  
(0.5630)                  
0.1652                  
(0.2232)                  
Children under 
18 in HH 
-0.1494                  
(0.3423)                  
-0.0812                  
(0.1856)                  
0.0200                  
(0.5662)                  
0.0106                  
(0.1717)                  
College_grad 
-0.0236                  
(0.3307)                  
-0.0128                  
(0.1798)                  
-0.0462                  
(0.4143)                  
-0.0205                  
(0.1598)                  
Income 
0.6712***                  
(0.0343)                 
0.3652***                  
(0.0191)                 
0.6285***                  
(0.0164)                 
1.0903***                  
(0.1007)                 
Family size 
-0.7767***                  
(0.2543)                 
-0.4226***                  
(0.1384)                 
-0.7802**                  
(0.3738)                 
-0.0119                  
(0.1177)                  
 
1.
 Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively.  
2.
 For Bivariate Tobit model, the dependent variable is measured in thousands of dollars. The explanatory variables 
in the BVT models are gender, age, race, residency, marital status, education, and family size 
3.
 Marginal effects from the BVT model are calculated using Delta Method. 
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Table A6  
ZIOP Marginal Effects, All Sample 
 
Prob 
(g=0) 
Prob 
(g=1) 
Prob (g=2) Prob (g=3) 
 
Non-
participation 
Pr(𝜏=0) 
Zero 
contribution 
Pr(𝜏=1,?̃?=0) 
Full 
Pr(g=0) 
gender 0.0073 0.0009 
0.0081  
(0.0088) 
0.0091 
(0.0075) 
-0.0045 
(0.0116) 
-0.0002 
(0.0014) 
Race 0.0063 -0.0050 
0.0013  
(0.0105) 
-0.0043 
(0.0086) 
0.0074 
(0.0172) 
0.0008 
(0.0020) 
bornusa -0.0155 0.0173 
0.0018  
(0.0122) 
0.0215** 
(0.0099)         
-0.0281 
(0.0209) 
-0.0028 
(0.0024) 
ownrent -0.0553 -0.0301 
-0.0854*** 
(0.0081)         
-0.1199*** 
(0.0067)         
0.0805*** 
(0.0125)         
0.0059*** 
(0.0015)         
employed -0.0549 -0.0037 
-0.0586*** 
(0.0083)         
-0.0628*** 
(0.0069)         
0.0282** 
(0.0128)         
0.0013 
(0.0015) 
income -0.0056 -0.0155 
-0.0210*** 
(0.0019)         
-0.0388*** 
(0.0017)         
0.0326*** 
(0.0016)         
0.0028*** 
(0.0002)         
childyes -0.0327 0.0060 
-0.0267** 
(0.0111)           
-0.0199** 
(0.0094)         
0.0007 
(0.0148) 
-0.0006 
(0.0018) 
educ -0.0473 -0.0099 
-0.0571*** 
(0.0108)         
-0.0684*** 
(0.0093)         
0.0375*** 
(0.0127)         
0.0023 
(0.0016) 
age10 0.0045 -0.0055 
-0.0010 
(0.0016) 
-0.0073*** 
(0.0012)         
0.0091*** 
(0.0035)         
0.0009** 
(0.0004)         
Family size 0.0023 0.0147 
0.0170***    
(0.0053)         
0.0338*** 
(0.0045)         
-0.0298*** 
(0.0075)         
-0.0026*** 
(0.0009)         
confidence -0.1451 -0.0364 
-0.1815*** 
(0.0076)         
-0.2231*** 
(0.0056)         
0.1269*** 
(0.0188)         
0.0082*** 
(0.0021)         
trust  
-0.0209 -0.0209** 
(0.0096)           
-0.0239** 
(0.0110)         
0.0412** 
(0.0189)         
0.0036** 
(0.0017)         
Have more 
give more 
 
-0.1446 -0.1446*** 
(0.0100)         
-0.1655*** 
(0.0114)         
0.2851*** 
(0.0197)         
0.0251*** 
(0.0017)         
inadequacy  
0.0339 
0.0339*** 
(0.0088)         
0.0388*** 
(0.0101)         
-0.0668*** 
(0.0174)         
-0.0059*** 
(0.0015)         
 
1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A7  
ZIOP Marginal Effects, Religious Group 
 
Prob 
(g=0) 
Prob 
(g=1) 
Prob (g=2) Prob (g=3) 
 
Non-
participation 
Pr(𝜏=0) 
Zero 
contribution 
Pr(𝜏=1,?̃?=0) 
Full 
Pr(g=0) 
gender 0.0236 -0.0017 
0.0219*   
(0.0125) 
0.0178*** 
(0.0007)    
-0.0058 
(0.0195)     
0.0002 
(0.0027)     
Race 0.0290 0.0070 
0.0360***   
(0.0137) 
0.0523*** 
(0.0032)    
-0.0347 
(0.0259)     
-0.0026 
(0.0035)     
bornusa 0.0053 0.0054 
0.0107   
(0.0202) 
0.0232*** 
(0.0058)    
-0.0187 
(0.0402)     
-0.0018 
(0.0054)     
ownrent -0.0502 -0.0194 
-0.0696*** 
(0.0121) 
-0.1150*** 
(0.0014)    
0.0821*** 
(0.0201)    
0.0068** 
(0.0028)    
employed -0.0854 -0.0028 
-0.0882*** 
(0.0119) 
-0.0947*** 
(0.0026)    
0.0482** 
(0.0221)    
0.0022 
(0.0030)     
income -0.0024 -0.0103 
-0.0126*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.0367*** 
(0.0003)    
0.0322*** 
(0.0028)    
0.0032*** 
(0.0004)    
childyes -0.0663 -0.0079 
-0.0742*** 
(0.0180) 
-0.0928*** 
(0.0020)    
0.0549** 
(0.0221)    
0.0035 
(0.0032)     
educ -0.0182 -0.0104 
-0.0286** 
(0.0141) 
-0.0530*** 
(0.0007)    
0.0400** 
(0.0190)    
0.0035 
(0.0027)     
age10 -0.0037 -0.0069 
-0.0107*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.0269*** 
(0.0012)    
0.0228*** 
(0.0061)    
0.0022*** 
(0.0008)    
Family 
size 
-0.0086 0.0011 
-0.0074 
(0.0087) 
-0.0048*** 
(0.0004)    
0.0005 
(0.0119)     
-0.0002 
(0.0017)     
confidence -0.1043 -0.0235 
-0.1279*** 
(0.0127) 
-0.1830*** 
(0.0079)    
0.1199*** 
(0.0335)    
0.0089** 
(0.0043)    
trust  -0.0044 
-0.0044 
(0.0093) 
-0.0104 
(0.0217)     
0.0135 
(0.0280)     
0.0014 
(0.0029)     
Have more 
give more 
 -0.1006 
-0.1006*** 
(0.0105) 
-0.2357*** 
(0.0246)    
0.3050*** 
(0.0318)    
0.0313 *** 
(0.0033)    
inadequacy  0.0354 
0.0354***   
(0.0092) 
0.0830*** 
(0.0215)    
-0.1074 
*** 
(0.0278)    
-0.0110*** 
(0.0029)    
 
1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively.   
   
89 
 
Table A8  
ZIOP Marginal Effects, Less-religious Group 
 
Prob 
(g=0) 
Prob 
(g=1) 
Prob (g=2) Prob (g=3) 
 
Non-
participation 
Pr(𝜏=0) 
Zero 
contribution 
Pr(𝜏=1,?̃?=0) 
Full 
Pr(g=0) 
gender -0.0316 -0.0224 
-0.0540*** 
(0.0099)         
-0.0599*** 
(0.0231)    
0.0350*** 
(0.0129)    
0.0027* 
(0.0015)    
Race -0.0095 -0.0242 
-0.0337*** 
(0.0115)         
-0.0401 
(0.0337)     
0.0308 
(0.0231)     
0.0026 
(0.0026)     
bornusa -0.0254 0.0408 
0.0154 
(0.0100) 
0.0261 
(0.0320)     
-0.0401* 
(0.0233)    
-0.0039 
(0.0026)     
ownrent -0.0509 -0.0505 
-0.1014*** 
(0.0090)         
-0.1147*** 
(0.0225)    
0.0731*** 
(0.0135)    
0.0058*** 
(0.0016)    
employed -0.0245 -0.0060 
-0.0305*** 
(0.0095)         
-0.0321 
(0.0232)     
0.0140 
(0.0136)     
0.0009 
(0.0016)     
income -0.0073 -0.0190 
-0.0262*** 
(0.0022)         
-0.0312*** 
(0.0043)    
0.0241*** 
(0.0020)    
0.0020*** 
(0.0002)    
childyes -0.0048 0.0222 
0.0175* 
(0.0089)            
0.0233 
(0.0279)     
-0.0244 
(0.0200)     
-0.0023 
(0.0023)     
educ -0.0669 -0.0054 
-0.0723*** 
(0.0137)         
-0.0738** 
(0.0296)    
0.0253* 
(0.0151)   
0.0013 
(0.0018)     
age10 0.0113 -0.0024 
0.0089*** 
(0.0014)         
0.0082* 
(0.0049)    
-0.0004 
(0.0037)     
0.0001 
(0.0004)     
Family 
size 
0.0086 0.0273 
0.0359*** 
(0.0047)         
0.0431*** 
(0.0136)    
-0.0341*** 
(0.0092)    
-0.0029*** 
(0.0011)    
confidenc
e 
-0.1581 -0.0305 
-0.1886*** 
(0.0054)         
-0.1966*** 
(0.0241)    
0.0803*** 
(0.0207)    
0.0050** 
(0.0023)    
trust  -0.0432 
-0.0432** 
(0.0196)         
-0.0114** 
(0.0052)    
0.0501** 
(0.0227)    
0.0045** 
(0.0020)    
Have 
more give 
more 
 -0.1858 
-0.1858*** 
(0.0190)         
-0.0490*** 
(0.0050)    
0.2156*** 
(0.0220)    
0.0193*** 
(0.0020)    
inadequac
y 
 0.0104 
0.0104 
(0.0172) 
0.0027 
(0.0045)     
-0.0121 
(0.0200)     
-0.0011 
(0.0018)     
 
1. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table A9 
 Variables Description, Household Bargaining 
  
Variables  Definition 
Tax price of giving 
Tax price of giving equals to 1 for non-itemizes, and it equals 
(1-marginal tax rate) for itemizers. Marginal tax rates for all 
households are calculated from information such as itemization 
status, income, filing status, and etc. 
Income Total income for the household in the relevant year 
Age of husband Age of husband 
Age of wife Age of wife 
Husband high school 
graduate, attended college, 
college graduate 
Indicator variables for highest level of education obtained, as 
appropriate. The base group is those who did not complete high 
school. 
Wife high school graduate, 
attended college, college 
graduate 
Indicator variables for highest level of education obtained, as 
appropriate. The base group is those who did not complete high 
school. 
Husband Hispanic Dummy variable equals 1 if husband is Hispanic 
Wife Hispanic Dummy variable equals 1 if wife is Hispanic 
Husband Church goer 
It equals 1 if husband claims to go to church at least 12 times a 
year 
Wife Church goer It equals 1 if wife claims to go to church at least 12 times a year 
Husband health 
Dummy variable equals 1 if husband's health condition is at 
least good 
Wife health 
Dummy variable equals 1 if wife's health condition is at least 
good 
Husband employed Indicator variable of husband's current employment status 
Wife employed Indicator variable of wife's current employment status 
Husband protestant Dummy variable equals 1 if husband is protestant 
Wife protestant Dummy variable equals 1 if wife is protestant 
Urban 
Dummy variable equals 1 if the household locates at urban or 
metropolitan area. 
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Table A10 Basic Model of Couples Bargaining over Charitable Giving, Whole Sample 
    Log of total giving 
𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛?̂? = 𝛿𝑋?̂? + 𝜀𝑗 
   Log of total giving 
𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ =𝐴𝑋ℎ̂ + 𝜀ℎ 
 
   Log of total giving 
𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂? = 𝐵𝑋?̂? + 𝜀𝑤 
 
lntaxpricegiv -0.784 0.245 -1.515** 
 (0.707) (0.629) (0.588) 
lnFAMINC 0.508*** 0.592*** 0.505*** 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.042) 
ageH 0.017*** 0.022***  
 (0.005) (0.002)  
ageW 0.008  0.025*** 
 (0.006)  (0.002) 
highgrad_H -0.053 -0.073  
 (0.082) (0.072)  
highgrad_W -0.005  0.082 
 (0.081)  (0.065) 
col_H 0.288*** 0.284***  
 (0.086) (0.074)  
col_W 0.181**  0.358*** 
 (0.084)  (0.067) 
colgrad_H 0.277*** 0.440***  
 (0.084) (0.072)  
colgrad_W 0.321***  0.530*** 
 (0.086)  (0.068) 
hispanH -0.488*** -0.703***  
 (0.144) (0.095)  
hispanW -0.295**  -0.555*** 
 (0.145)  (0.089) 
churchH 0.766*** 1.062***  
 (0.077) (0.045)  
churchW 0.435***  1.030*** 
 (0.082)  (0.043) 
health_husband 0.061 0.087  
 (0.086) (0.077)  
health_wife 0.076  0.099 
 (0.081)  (0.067) 
workingH 0.120 0.128*  
 (0.075) (0.069)  
workingW -0.006  -0.043 
 (0.054)  (0.047) 
urban 0.127** 0.064 0.099** 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.047) 
Constant -0.812 -2.019** -0.189 
 (0.913) (0.815) (0.745) 
    
1. 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
2
. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A11 Basic Model of Couples Bargaining over Charitable Giving, Strict Protestants 
    Log of total giving 
𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛?̂? = 𝛿𝑋?̂? + 𝜀𝑗 
   Log of total giving 
𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ =𝐴𝑋ℎ̂ + 𝜀ℎ 
 
   Log of total giving 
𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂? = 𝐵𝑋?̂? + 𝜀𝑤 
 
lntaxpricegiv -0.463 0.500 -1.020 
 (1.064) (0.940) (0.898) 
lnFAMINC 0.655*** 0.722*** 0.636*** 
 (0.086) (0.077) (0.068) 
ageH 0.010 0.017***  
 (0.008) (0.002)  
ageW 0.008  0.019*** 
 (0.008)  (0.002) 
highgrad_H 0.005 -0.089  
 (0.115) (0.103)  
highgrad_W -0.011  0.043 
 (0.114)  (0.098) 
col_H 0.341*** 0.266**  
 (0.121) (0.108)  
col_W 0.113  0.296*** 
 (0.118)  (0.100) 
colgrad_H 0.343*** 0.427***  
 (0.121) (0.106)  
colgrad_W 0.288**  0.510*** 
 (0.123)  (0.104) 
hispanH 0.658** 0.539**  
 (0.292) (0.228)  
hispanW -0.178  0.192 
 (0.280)  (0.215) 
churchH 0.934*** 1.229***  
 (0.113) (0.070)  
churchW 0.465***  1.282*** 
 (0.125)  (0.070) 
health_husband 0.042 0.068  
 (0.114) (0.105)  
health_wife 0.000  0.051 
 (0.109)  (0.093) 
workingH 0.088 0.102  
 (0.101) (0.096)  
workingW -0.053  -0.098 
 (0.077)  (0.068) 
urban 0.079 0.048 0.060 
 (0.070) (0.067) (0.062) 
Constant -2.142 -3.220** -1.545 
 (1.450) (1.277) (1.171) 
    
1. 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
2
. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
95 
 
 
Table A12 Basic Model of Couples Bargaining over Charitable Giving, Less or Non-protestants 
    Log of total giving 
𝐺𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛?̂? = 𝛿𝑋?̂? + 𝜀𝑗 
   Log of total giving 
𝐺ℎ𝑢𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑑̂ =𝐴𝑋ℎ̂ + 𝜀ℎ 
 
   Log of total giving 
𝐺𝑤𝑖𝑓?̂? = 𝐵𝑋?̂? + 𝜀𝑤 
lntaxpricegiv -0.720 -0.197 -1.715** 
 (0.906) (0.815) (0.744) 
lnFAMINC 0.448*** 0.513*** 0.438*** 
 (0.061) (0.057) (0.050) 
ageH 0.025*** 0.028***  
 (0.007) (0.002)  
ageW 0.010  0.032*** 
 (0.007)  (0.002) 
highgrad_H -0.190* -0.154  
 (0.112) (0.096)  
highgrad_W -0.001  0.035 
 (0.110)  (0.084) 
col_H 0.137 0.197**  
 (0.116) (0.099)  
col_W 0.180  0.286*** 
 (0.115)  (0.087) 
colgrad_H 0.165 0.389***  
 (0.111) (0.093)  
colgrad_W 0.327***  0.481*** 
 (0.114)  (0.085) 
hispanH -0.572*** -0.726***  
 (0.156) (0.103)  
hispanW -0.198  -0.512*** 
 (0.160)  (0.094) 
churchH 0.459*** 0.709***  
 (0.101) (0.058)  
churchW 0.331***  0.653*** 
 (0.104)  (0.054) 
health_husband 0.171 0.154  
 (0.127) (0.110)  
health_wife 0.159  0.152* 
 (0.114)  (0.092) 
workingH 0.158 0.115  
 (0.106) (0.096)  
workingW 0.007  -0.024 
 (0.073)  (0.062) 
urban 0.305*** 0.201** 0.249*** 
 (0.085) (0.078) (0.070) 
Constant -0.847 -1.268 0.241 
 (1.128) (1.021) (0.922) 
    
1. 
Standard errors in parentheses; 
2
. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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